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Abstract
Three Essays on Experimental and Microeconomics
by
Patrick James Holder
This dissertation contains three chapters on experimental economics and microeconomics.
In the first chapter, Dynamic Investment and Preferences over the Resolution of Risk, I
report the results of a laboratory experiment which attempts to explain the finding that
individuals invest less in risky assets when risk is gradually resolved over time, rather
than all at once. Though the literature has traditionally attributed this behavior to a
cognitive error, Kőszegi and Rabin (2009) recently characterized this finding as the result
of non-standard preferences over the resolution of risk. My results reject the traditional
“cognitive errors" explanation in favor of Kőszegi and Rabin’s “non-standard preferences"
explanation. In the second chapter, Kidney Co-operative: A Mechanism to Improve on
Human Kidney Markets, myself and coauthors propose a mechanism called the kidney co-
operative which is designed to provide sufficient incentives to alleviate the human kidney
shortage, while at the same time addressing the concerns regarding the potential losers
to such a reform. We show that it is reasonable to expect that the number of transplants
will be larger under the kidney co-operative mechanism than under either the status quo
or the conventional market mechanism. In the third chapter, Charity in the Laboratory:
Matching, Competition, and Group Identity myself and a coauthor study the effects of
donation matching, competition, and group membership on charitable donations using
a laboratory experiment. We find that providing matching donations to all subjects or
having individuals compete for the privilege to have their donations matched (we match
vii
the top half of donations in each session), raises donation levels modestly. However,
arbitrarily assigning subjects to teams which competed for matching funds substantially
raised donation levels. We appeal to the notions of group identity and team dynamics to
explain our results.
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Chapter 1
Dynamic Investment and Preferences
over the Resolution of Risk
Patrick Holder
1.1 Introduction
Between 1889 and 1978, the average real return on the S&P 500 was 7% while the return
on risk-free debt was less than 1%. Recreating such a large difference in returns within
the standard Arrow-Debreu framework would require investors to have coefficients of
relative risk aversion in excess of 30, whereas typical estimates suggest the coefficient
is close to 1 (Mehra and Prescott, 1985). Like the S&P 500, many real-world assets
have values which evolve slowly over time: stocks, bonds, and real estate, to name a
few. Unlike standard “one-shot” gambles which resolve risk all at once, these investments
provide feedback about their performance over the course of many periods.
1
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A series of laboratory experiments suggest that it is this periodic feedback which is
driving the large difference in returns between the S&P 500 and risk-free debt; researchers
starting with Gneezy and Potters (1997)1 have found that subjects invest less in risky
assets as they evaluate financial outcomes more frequently. I call this finding aversion to
the gradual resolution of risk (AGRR). As investors tend to monitor their stock portfolios
closely (and thus receive frequent updates on financial outcomes), this large difference in
returns has been attributed to AGRR2.
Though AGRR has been widely regarded as a cognitive error, Kőszegi and Rabin (2009)
recently introduced a preferences-based explanation for this empirical link between feed-
back frequency and willingness to invest in a risky asset. In this paper, I study whether
or not Kőszegi-Rabin preferences can account for AGRR in laboratory subjects using
two experimental tasks. The first task classifies subjects according to the preferences
that Kőszegi and Rabin argue are responsible for the behavior observed by Gneezy and
Potters (1997). The second task – a replication of Gneezy and Potter’s experiment – is a
simple dynamic investment problem, in which the frequency of feedback about the value
of a risky asset is varied between treatments.
I exploit natural heterogeneity in subject preferences elicited in the first task to study
whether these preferences can be used to predict investment levels in the second task.
If the negative correlation between feedback frequency and investment is observed most
often in those subjects who have non-standard Kőszegi-Rabin preferences, we can con-
clude that these preferences contribute to AGRR. However, if this negative correlation
is present in all subjects – even those who have standard “expected utility” preferences
in the first task – it would be likely that the cognitive error explanation is correct.
1Thaler et al. (1997) concurrently conducted similar research.
2Benartzi and Thaler (1995)
2
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Benartzi and Thaler (1995) were the first researchers to suggest that individuals have
AGRR. Their theory of myopic loss aversion relies on the interaction of two behavioral
concepts: loss aversion3, which asserts that individuals weigh losses more heavily than
commensurate gains, and narrow bracketing, a process in which people consider the utility
changes from multiple gambles in isolation, rather than considering the overall effect on
utility of the resulting compound gamble.4 As an example, consider an investor who faces
the one-time opportunity to save for retirement by distributing a fixed wealth across two
assets: a risky asset which pays higher average returns, and a safe asset which pays lower
returns. This investor neither adds to nor subtracts from the portfolio (besides reinvesting
all earnings) until the day he retires, at which point he consumes the entire value of the
investment. He does, however, check the portfolio’s performance once a year in the
interim. Such an investor would maximize expected (discounted) utility by considering
the expected utility from the distribution of returns that each portfolio induces on the day
that he retires. A myopically loss averse investor, however, would choose his portfolio as
if to maximize utility from wealth a year from now when he checks-in on his investment.
Such behavior is called narrow bracketing. By assuming that people are loss averse over
changes in wealth, Benartzi and Thaler show that narrow bracketing drives investors
towards portfolios which mitigate potential short-term decreases in wealth, making them
appear extremely risk averse.
Commentators like Tversky and Kahneman (1985), Kahneman and Lovallo (1993), and
Read, Loewenstein, and Rabin (1999) regard narrow bracketing as a cognitive error –
a mistake which inhibits utility maximization in environments with disaggregated risk.
This cognitive error narrative is so ingrained that investment services regularly warn
3Kahneman and Tversky (1979), Tversky and Kahneman (1992)
4Benartzi and Thaler originally referred to the second factor as mental accounting (Thaler, 1985). I
follow later authors like Read, Loewenstein, and Rabin (1999), by using the term narrow bracketing.
3
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clients against the dangers of checking their portfolios too regularly, with some firms ac-
tively taking measures to prevent portfolio evaluations which they few as “too frequent”.5
Kőszegi and Rabin (2009) provide an alternate, preferences-based, account of AGRR by
presenting a model in which subjects have non-standard preferences over the resolution
of risk. To provide an example of how these preferences might affect an agent’s decisions,
consider two gambles, presented to an agent in period t, each with identical probability
distributions over earnings. Winnings in either gamble are received at a later time,
period t+ 1. The gambles differ only in when they resolve their risk: one gamble reveals
its outcome in period t, while the other reveals its outcome more gradually, over the
course of t and t+ 1. If the agent doesn’t make plans contingent on information learned
in period t,6 the standard economic model asserts that the agent must be indifferent
between these gambles. An agent who preferred the one-shot gamble to the drawn-out
gamble would have AGRR for purely preference-based reasons. If Kőszegi and Rabin are
correct in their assertion that AGRR is driven entirely by preferences, investors may, in
fact, choose their portfolios and information about financial outcomes “correctly” (i.e. to
maximize utility). This would suggest that the push by investment firms to influence
their clients’ investment behavior may be unnecessary at best, and welfare decreasing at
worst.
Research on preferences which allow agents to not be indifferent between the above gam-
bles dates back to Kreps and Porteus (1978). These preferences have enjoyed significant
attention from both theorists and empiricists studying a wide range of topics. For exam-
5Popular online investment services with such warnings include Betterment
(https://www.betterment.com/resources/investment-strategy/behavioral-finance-investing-
strategy/high-frequency-monitoring/) and Wealthfront (https://blog.wealthfront.com/often-check-
portfolio/). The latter only allows clients to modify their portfolios once a month in the hopes that this
will prevent those clients from checking their portfolios more frequently.
6That is, if this feedback is “noninstrumental”.
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ple, Epstein and Zin (1991) use these preferences to model intertemporal consumption
choice, while Ely, Frankel and Kamenica (2015) use them to explain demand for en-
tertainment goods like professional sports and mystery novels. The classification task
doesn’t only allow subjects to be classified as “expected utility” or “Kőszegi and Rabin”
types; the experimental design uses a novel methodology to simultaneously compare sev-
eral preference types at once. Authors like Ahlbrecht and Weber (1997), Lovallo and
Kahneman (2000), and Falk and Zimmerman (2014) have previously performed similar
classification exercises, however, the classification task contained herein allows for the
comparison of a larger number of models than previous research has compared.
I find that there is significant heterogeneity in subjects’ preferences over the resolution of
risk, with both the standard expected utility model and Kőszegi and Rabin’s preference
model describing a large number of subjects in the classification task (26% and 36% of
subjects, respectively). Moreover, I find that investments in the second task do appear to
be driven by these preference differences, suggesting that AGRR is the result of Kőszegi-
Rabin preferences rather than myopic loss aversion.
Section 2 reviews the experimental evidence in support of AGRR and describes a num-
ber of preference models which generate non-standard preferences over the resolution of
risk, focusing on Kőszegi and Rabin’s (2009) model. It concludes by presenting a sim-
ple framework which captures the predictions of these models. Section 3 describes an
experimental design which consists of two tasks, a classification task and an investment
task. It also presents a list of testable hypotheses which inform the experimental design.
Results from this design are reported in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
5
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1.2 Background & Theory
Benartzi and Thaler’s (1995) theory of myopic loss aversion makes the testable prediction
that as the frequency of feedback about the performance of a risky asset increases, the
investment in that asset decreases. This assumption, which I call aversion to the gradual
resolution of risk (AGRR) was first tested in a simple experiment developed by Gneezy
and Potters (1997). Their subjects were given the option to invest in a risky asset which
reveals its value over the course of nine periods. In one treatment, subjects receive
feedback about the value of the asset after each of the nine periods, while in the other
treatment, subjects only receive feedback once every three periods. As predicted by
Benartzi and Thaler (1995), the researchers found that investments were significantly
lower in the frequent feedback treatment, suggesting that laboratory subjects do, in fact
demonstrate AGRR. Gneezy and Potters interpret this result as evidence in favor of
myopic loss aversion.
This result was extended in two further studies. Haigh and List (2005) performed the
same experiment with both standard subjects (undergraduate college students) and pro-
fessional futures and options traders. They found that the professional traders exhibited
AGRR to a greater extent (that is, experienced a larger treatment effect) than standard
subjects, suggesting that exposure to risky assets does not attenuate AGRR. Addition-
allly, Bellemare et al. (2005) refined the original Gneezy and Potters result by showing
that AGRR is driven by the frequency of feedback, rather than the frequency with which
an investor can adjust his portfolio.
6
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1.2.1 Preferences over the Resolution of Risk
Kőszegi and Rabin (2009) provide an alternative account of the AGRR observed by
Gneezy and Potters and others. They argue that AGRR is purely a preference-based
phenomenon. Their model makes two assumptions: first, that beliefs about future con-
sumption affect individuals’ utility, and second, that individuals are loss averse to changes
in these beliefs. Specifically, Kőszegi and Rabin assume that agents in period t derive
instantaneous utility from consumption, ct, and beliefs about consumption in future peri-
ods, Ft,τ (where future periods are indexed by τ). Utility is assumed to take the following
form7:
ut = m(ct) +
T∑
τ=t
γt,τN(Ft,τ |Ft−1,τ )
m(ct) is the standard reference-independent utility from consumption. Ft,τ ∈ ∆(R+) 8
are the beliefs held in period t about period-τ consumption, and N(Ft,τ |Ft−1,τ ) captures
gain-loss utility generated by changes in beliefs from period t− 1 to period t about these
future consumptions. Agents make “ordered comparisons” between their past and current
beliefs, comparing the highest percentile consumption in Ft,τ to the highest percentile
consumption in Ft−1,τ , the second-highest percentile consumption in Ft,τ to the second
highest in Ft−1,τ , etc. Agents are loss averse in all such comparisons.9
7This treatment of Kőszegi and Rabin’s model makes some simplifying assumptions for the sake of
exposition. Appendix A presents the full model, in addition to providing an illustrative example.
8Where ∆(R+) is the set of all probability distributions over R+
9Formally, for p ∈ (0, 1), if cF (p) is the consumption level at percentile p:
N(Ft,τ |Ft−1,τ ) =
∫ 1
0
µ[m(cFt,τ (p))−m(cFt−1,τ (p))]dp
Where µ(·) is the a standard piecewise loss-aversion function (with λ > 1):
µ(x) =
{
x x ≥ 0
λx x < 0
7
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Next, note the γt,τ parameter in the above utility function. This parameter “determine[s]
the relative importance of news as a function of how far in advance of consumption
the news is received” (Kőszegi and Rabin, pg. 913). The authors assume that γτ,τ ≥
γτ−1,τ ≥ γτ−2,τ ≥ ... ≥ γ0,τ ≥ 0, and they specifically discuss two cases which obey these
inequalities. When τ − t is large – that is, when beliefs about consumption in a very
distant period change – the effect on utility might reasonably be assumed to be small.
As the consumption period draws nearer, changes in beliefs about consumption in that
period might have a more profound effect on utility. In this case, γτ,τ > γτ−1,τ > γτ−2,τ >
... > γ0,τ > 0. However, if this “news utility” is invariant to the temporal distance between
the change in the beliefs and the consumption actually taking place, γt,τ = 1 ∀t, τ .10
Kőszegi and Rabin’s model makes two primary predictions. First, agents prefer informa-
tion about future consumption all at once, rather than receiving a trickle of information
over several periods. This is the result of agents’ loss aversion towards changes in be-
liefs. Intuitively, beliefs over future consumption which bounce back-and-forth repeatedly
without changing much on net – as might be induced by the frequent monitoring of a
stock portfolio – will be utility decreasing in the aggregate, since small down-ticks hurt
more than up-ticks of equal size are enjoyable.
Second, if γτ,τ > γτ−1,τ > γτ−2,τ > ... > γ0,τ > 0, agents prefer information to be received
earlier rather than later. This is intuitive in the case where there is an equal chance
of beliefs moving up or down. Since loss aversion makes this change in beliefs utility-
decreasing in expectation, the agent would prefer to receive the news as far away as
10To complete their preference model, Kőszegi and Rabin assume that, in period t, agents maximize
the non-discounted sum of their instantaneous utilities,
U t ≡
T∑
τ=t
uτ
8
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possible from the period in which consumption will take place.
Kőszegi and Rabin aren’t the only authors to model preferences over when risk is resolved.
Next, I briefly introduce other prominent models of these non-standard preferences. As
Kőszegi and Rabin isn’t the only alternative to the standard expected utility model, I
develop a simple framework which allows subjects to be classified as one of the various
preference types predicted by these models. This framework is introduced at the end of
the section. The interested reader can find much greater detail about these models in
appendix A, including an example which illustrates the mechanics behind each model.
Like Kőszegi and Rabin; Ely, Frankel, and Kamenica (2015) assume that agents derive
utility from changes in beliefs. These authors assume that changes in beliefs generate
“entertainment utility”, which is assumed to always increase when beliefs change, even
for beliefs which update towards a less favorable outcome. As in Kőszegi and Rabin,
utility is assumed to change by more the larger is the update in beliefs, however, agents
display diminishing sensitivity towards changes in these beliefs. Due to this diminishing
sensitivity, agents would always prefer to have uncertainty resolved over more periods
rather than fewer.
Kreps and Porteus (1978) were the first authors to consider preferences over the resolution
of uncertainty which differ from the standard model. Instead of assuming that changes in
beliefs enter directly in the utility function (as in the previous models), Kreps and Porteus
generate non-standard preferences by assuming that agents apply a distortion function
to the utilities of possible outcomes before calculating expected utilities. Depending on
the shape of this distortion function, agents can display a preference for uncertainty to
be resolved either as early as possible, or as late as possible.
Individuals’ preferences can be thought of as spanning two dimensions. The first di-
9
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mension, which I refer to as concentration, dictates a person’s preference for resolving
uncertainty all at once or spread-out across multiple periods. Kőszegi and Rabin’s model
predicts that subjects display a preference for risk to be resolved all at once, which I
call clumped preferences. Ely, Frankel, and Kamenica’s (2015) model, on the other hand,
predicts that subjects display a preference for risk to be resolved over multiple periods;
I call these piecemeal preferences11.
The second dimension, which I refer to as timing, describes a subject’s preference to
resolve uncertainty earlier or later. The model of Kreps and Porteus (1978) can rationalize
both a preference for risk to be resolved as early as possible – which I refer to as an early
preference – or as late as possible – which I refer to as a late preference. Kőszegi and
Rabin’s model can also generate early preferences with γt,τ ’s which are decreasing in
t−τ (see section 2.2.1). Individuals with Kőszegi-Rabin utility can thus display clumped
preferences, early preferences, or preferences for both clumped and early resolution of
risk. These models’ predictions are summarized in table 1.
Table 1: Preference Types
Timing
Early Neither Late
Concentration
Clumped KR KR -
Neither KR/KP EU KP
Piecemeal - EFK -
KR denotes Kőszegi and Rabin’s (2009) preference types, EFK denotes
Ely, Frankel, and Kamenica’s (2015) types, KP denotes Kreps and Por-
teus’s (1978) types, and EU denotes standard expected utility types.
Note that, under the standard model, agents are indifferent towards
the timing of the resolution of risk.
The classification exercise categorizes subjects based on which of the nine cells in table 1
11I borrow the terms clumped and piecemeal from Falk and Zimmermann (2014).
10
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subjects’ preferences correspond with. Thus, some subjects will be assigned types which
do not match the predictions of any of the models. For example, a mass of subjects
are classified as having late and piecemeal preferences (the lower-righthand cell), though
no one model generates those preferences. These subjects’ choices could, however, be
rationalized with a utility function which has features of both Kreps and Porteus’s (1978)
and Ely, Frankel, and Kamenica’s (2015) models.
A handful of authors have conducted classification experiments on either the concentra-
tion or timing dimensions in isolation, but this research is, to my knowledge, the first to
classify subjects on both dimensions simultaneously. The concentration dimension has
been studied by Zimmermann (2014) and Falk and Zimmermann (2014). Zimmermann
(2014) elicits willingnesses to pay for gambles which reveal their outcomes in a clumped
or piecemeal manner using a between-subjects design. He finds no difference in willing-
nesses to pay in the aggregate. Falk and Zimmermann (2014), on the otherhand, find
that 90% of subjects prefer the clumped resolution of risk to piecemeal resolution when
subjects are learning about whether or not they will receive a painful electric shock.
Chew and Ho (1994), Ahlbrecht and Weber (1997), and Lovallo and Kahneman (2000)
find that, on the timing dimension, the majority of subjects prefer the early resolution of
risk to the late resolution. These studies use exclusively hypothetical subject responses.
Moreover, they all consider environments in which there is a planning benefit to resolving
risk early (that is, these experiments dealt with instrumental information), which could
result in a preference for early resolution even within the expected utility framework.
Kocher, Krawczyk, and Van Winden (2014) find more preference heterogeneity in an
experiment with incentivized subject responses, however, these authors also consider an
environment in which information is potentially instrumental.
11
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Kőszegi and Rabin’s preferences – the central topic of this paper – span both the concen-
tration and the timing dimensions. Thus, it is important that the preference elicitation
task is able to distinguish across preferences on both dimensions simultaneously in order
to detect the full set of subjects with preferences consistent with Kőszegi and Rabin’s
model. The preference elicitation task and the investment task are detailed in the fol-
lowing section.
1.3 Experimental Design & Hypotheses
This section first describes an experimental design motivated by the previous section. It
then presents a series of hypotheses which address the underlying cause of AGRR.
1.3.1 The Classification Task
An experimental session consists of two back-to-back tasks. The first task, called the
classification task, classifies subjects according to their preferences over the resolution of
risk, while the second, the investment task is a replication of the dynamic investment
problem from Gneezy and Potters (1997). Subjects were not aware of the second task
during the first.
The first task serves to classify subjects as one of several types of agents identified in the
literature. This classification is carried-out by eliciting from each subject a preference
ordering over four gambles; these gambles differ only in when they resolve their risk,
they are otherwise identical. Each pays $50 at the end of the experiment with probability
25.1% and pays nothing otherwise. Whether or not the $50 outcome obtains is determined
12
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by drawing two values, x and y, from the discrete uniform distribution {1, 2, 3, ...100}.
If x + y ≥ 130, the subject receives the $50 payment. The gambles differ only in when
x and y are revealed to the subjects. Section 1B of the classification task (see figure 1)
is the hour long period over which x and y are revealed. The numbers can be revealed
at three points over the course of section 1B: at the beginning, 30 minutes through the
section, or at the end of the section.12 Because subjects are in the laboratory for the
duration of the experiment (without access to cell phones or other means of external
communication), they cannot take actions contingent on the values of x and y before the
experiment concludes, making any information portrayed by x and y noninstrumental.
Figure 1: The Timeline of a Session
Table 2 details when each of the four gambles – A, B, C, and D – reveal x and y.13 In
section 1A, a full preference ordering over the gambles is elicited in a manner which is
incentive compatible under all the models considered. This preference ordering allows
subjects to be classified by their preferences over the resolution of risk.
12During the time between draws of x and y in section 1B, subjects performed unincentivized “filler
tasks”.
13Roughly half of the subjects saw the gambles named and arranged as they are presented here, while
the other half of subjects were shown the gambles in the order C, D, A, B (with the gambles renamed
appropriately).
13
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Table 2: The Gambles
The Beginning
of Section 1B
30 Minutes Into
Section 1B
The End of
Section 1B
Gamble A x, y - -
Gamble B - - x, y
Gamble C x y -
Gamble D - x y
The preference ordering is elicited in a two-part procedure; subjects were informed about
both parts before making any decisions. In the first part, subjects are instructed to rank
the four gambles from favorite to least favorite. In order to incentivize subjects to reveal
their true (weak) preference ordering, the gamble subjects actually faced is determined
probabilistically, where:
• Subjects receive their favorite gamble with probability 42%
• Subjects receive their second favorite gamble with probability 33%
• Subjects receive their third favorite gamble with probability 17%
• Subjects receive their least favorite gamble with probability 8%
Though this procedure generates a weak preference ordering over the gambles, it doesn’t
allow for differentiation between strict preference and indifference. In order to achieve
cardinal measures of preference, subjects were next presented with the opportunity to
“buy”14 probability distributions which were potentially more favorable.15 Subjects were
given three such opportunities. First, they were asked if they would like to pay c cents
for a new probability distribution which moved 8% of the initial probability mass from
14Though the terms “buy” and “pay” are used throughout this section, subjects’ instructions contain
more neutral language. Wording which could imply ownership was avoided so as to minimize possible
endowment effects (Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler; 1990).
15Allowing subjects the opportunity to buy weakly preferred distributions over bundles (in this case,
the bundles are the gambles A, B, C, and D) is a design feature previously used by Toussaert (2016).
14
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the second favorite to the first favorite gamble. Then, they were asked if they would like
to pay c for the probability distribution which moved 8% probability mass from the third
favorite to the second favorite gamble. Finally, they were asked if they would like to pay
c for the probability distribution which moved 8% mass from the least favorite to the
third favorite gamble16 . Several values of c were presented to subjects for each of the
three choices:
c ∈ {1, 5, 10, 25, 50, 100, 200}
For each session, one of the values of c was incentivized, while the rest were hypothetical.
Roughly half of the subjects faced incentivized prices of c = 10, while the other half faced
prices of c = 25.17 Subjects’ choices were not allowed to violate monotonicity in wealth,
for example, a subject couldn’t be unwilling to pay 10 cents to move 8% probability mass
from their second to their first favorite gamble, but willing to pay 25 cents for the same
offer.18
16The probabilities with which each gamble are initially chosen guarantee that subjects’ first favorite
gamble will always be most likely to be selected, their second favorite gamble will be second most likely
to be selected, etc. If, for instance, the initial probabilities with which each gamble was chosen had been
40%, 30%, 20%, and 10%, a subject could have paid to move probability mass from their second to their
first favorite gamble, and also paid to move probability mass from their third to their fourth favorite
gamble. This would have resulted in a final probability distribution over gambles (from most to least
favorite) of 48%, 22%, 28%, and 2%, making a subject’s third most favorite gamble more likely to be
selected than his second most favorite gamble. Probabilities were chosen to prevent such issues.
17A series of two-sample tests of proportion fail to reject the hypothesis that changing the incentivized
value of c has an effect on subjects’ decisions, thus, both groups are pooled in the following analysis.
18Subjects were first asked if they would be willing to pay the incentivized value of c (and they were
told that their decision would be enforced). If they were willing to pay the incentivized level of c to buy
a new probability distribution, they were then asked if they would have been willing to pay for the new
distribution at the next highest level of c. For example, consider a subject for whom the incentivized c is
25 cents. He would first be asked whether or not he was willing to pay 25 cents to move 8% probability
mass from his second favorite gamble to his favorite gamble. If he was willing to pay 25 cents, he
would next be asked if he would have made the same decision for a “price” of 50 cents. This process
would continue until the subject either declined to pay, or until he was asked about the maximum price,
c = 200. A similar process ensured monotonicity in wealth for subjects who were not willing to pay for
the incentivized level of c. The price was lowered until the subject either reported a desire to pay for
the new probability distribution or until he was asked about the minimum price, c = 1.
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1.3.2 The Investment Task
The investment task – a replication of the experiment developed in Gneezy and Potters
(1997) – was revealed following the completion of the classification task. This task
presents subjects with a simple dynamic investment problem which takes place over nine
rounds. In each round, subjects are endowed with 150 cents, and are asked to decide
what part of that endowment they would like to bet in a gamble. With probability 1/3,
the gamble returned any wagered money in addition to paying back 2.5 times the amount
bet. With probability 2/3, subjects lost any wagered money. Subjects could not bet any
money won in previous rounds.
The experiment was conducted using physical randomization devices (as was the case in
the original Gneezy and Potters experiment). Subjects are assigned a win letter – either
A, B, or C – which remains constant throughout a session. In each round, three balls
labeled A, B, and C are placed into a box, from which one of the three balls is drawn. If
the ball matching a subject’s win letter is drawn in a round, the subject wins the gamble,
otherwise, the subject loses.
The task has two treatments which are conducted in a between subjects design: a frequent
feedback treatment, F , and an infrequent feedback treatment, I. In the F treatment,
subjects play rounds one-by-one, observing the outcome of each round before placing
bets for the following round. In the I treatment, subjects play the rounds in blocks of
three. For example, at the beginning of round 1, subjects in the I treatment are required
to place their bets for rounds 1, 2, and 3. These bets were required to be equal. After
subjects have decided upon their bets, they are simultaneously shown the results of all
three rounds at once. They cannot assign a gain or loss to any particular round, but know
in the aggregate how many rounds have been won and how many have been lost within
16
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the set of three rounds. For subjects in the I treatment, this procedure was repeated a
second time for rounds 4, 5, and 6; and a third time for rounds 7, 8, and 9.
1.3.3 Hypotheses
This section presents the hypotheses that the above experimental tasks are designed to
address. The classification task allows subjects to be classified as one of nine preference
types described in the previous section. As agents in the standard expected utility
model are indifferent towards the manner in which risk is resolved, this model predicts
that subjects will be classified as EU types. On the other hand, Kőszegi and Rabin
(2009), Ely, Frankel, and Kamenica (2015), and Kreps and Porteus (1978) all assume
that individuals have non-standard preferences over the resolution of risk. Thus, the
expected utility model acts as the null hypothesis for each of these alternative models.
Hypothesis 1 – Expected Utility
Subjects are indifferent towards when risk is resolved.
AGRR states that, as the frequency of feedback about the performance of a risky asset
increases, investment in that asset decreases. Gneezy and Potters (1997) and others have
shown that laboratory subjects have AGRR, a finding predicted by both Benartzi and
Thaler’s (1995) myopic loss aversion and the preferences model of Kőszegi and Rabin
(2009). In my experimental design, subjects display AGRR if investments are lower
among subjects in the F treatment than they are among those in the I treatment.
17
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Hypothesis 2 – Aversion to the Gradual Resolution of Risk (AGRR)
Investments will be lower among subjects in the F treatment than among those
in the I treatment.
Kőszegi and Rabin’s model assumes that individuals have preferences that are clumped,
early, or early/clumped. Moreover, they assume that it is these preferences which cause
AGRR. Thus, in the context of this experiment, Kőszegi and Rabin’s preference model
anticipates that clumped, early, and early/clumped types will invest less in the F treat-
ment than in the I treatment, and that the overall difference between investment levels
in the F and I treatments among all subjects will be driven by individuals with these
three types.
Hypothesis 3 – Kőszegi-Rabin Preferences
Clumped, early, and early/clumped subjects will have lower investments in the
F treatment than in the I treatment. Overall differences in investment between
F and I treatments will be driven by these types.
In Kőszegi and Rabin’s framework, the stronger is an individual’s preference for how
risk is resolved, the more severe his AGRR becomes. Thus, subjects who have a greater
willingness to pay to decide how risk is resolved would also be more sensitive to the
frequency of feedback about the performance of a risky asset in deciding how much to
invest. In the context of this design, subjects who are willing to pay more money for a
preferred probability distribution in the classification task should have a larger difference
in investments between the F and I treatments in the investment task. This result, of
course, is only predicted among subjects with preferences consistent with Kőszegi and
18
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Rabin’s model: clumped, early, and early/clumped types.
Hypothesis 3.1 – AGRR Increasing in Strength of Preference
Among clumped, early, and early/clumped types, the difference between invest-
ments in the F and I treatments will increase as the total amount of money
subjects are willing to pay in the classification task increases.
Benartzi and Thaler’s theory of myopic loss aversion claims that individuals have AGRR
because they “narrowly bracket” risky prospects – that is, they fail to realize that current
risk will be integrated with other risks. As myopic loss aversion does not rely on prefer-
ences over the resolution of risk, this model assumes that all subjects – even those with
standard preferences over the resolution of risk (i.e. EU types) – will display AGRR.
Hypothesis 4 – Myopic Loss Aversion
Subjects of all preference types will have lower investments in the F treatment
than in the I treatment.
1.4 Results
This section presents data from 10 experimental sessions conducted at the Experimental
and Behavioral Economics Laboratory at UC Santa Barbara. A total of 118 subjects19
participated in sessions which lasted two hours. Including a $5 show-up fee, subjects
earned an average of approximately $25. The first task was administered via computer
19This includes three subjects who left in the middle of the experiment, and are not included in the
analysis.
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and was programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007), while the second task was conducted
with pen and paper, using physical randomization devices when needed. Subjects were
recruited with ORSEE (Greiner, 2004).
I first review the results of the classification task. Throughout, I assume that subjects
who are willing to pay any amount (one cent or more) to move probability mass from a
less preferred gamble to a more preferred gamble have a strict preference for the higher
ranked gamble. I interpret an unwillingness to pay even one cent to move probability
between a lower and higher ranked gamble as indifference between those gambles.
This preference ordering allows subjects to be individually classified as either one of the
nine preference types in figure 1, or unclassifiable, otherwise. Table 3 summarizes the
nine types, the preference orderings that are assigned to those types, and the predictions
of each of the preference models discussed in section 2.2.
Table 3: How Subjects Are Classified by Preference Orderings over Gambles
Timing
Early Neither Late
Concentration
Clumped KR
A  C  D & A  B
KR
A ∼ B  C ∼ D
-
B  D  C & B  A
Neither KR/KP
A  C  D  B
EU
A ∼ B ∼ C ∼ D
KP
B  D  C  A
Piecemeal -
C  D  B & A  B
EFK
C ∼ D  A ∼ B
-
D  C  A & B  A
Subjects who have non-standard preferences on only one dimension are referred to by
that preference only. For example, subjects with preferences A  C  D  B are
labeled early types. Subjects with preferences which cannot be rationalized using only
the timing or concentration dimensions are labeled with a slash, for example, a subject
with preferences D  B ∼ C  A would be labeled late/piecemeal.
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Note that the set of subjects obeying some preference orderings are subsets of other
preference groups. Specifically, subjects with the early type preference ordering also
satisfy the preference orderings for early/clumped types and early/piecemeal types, since
the ordering A  C  D  B satisfies the conditions for both early, early/clumped,
and early/piecemeal types. Similarly, late types also satisfy the preference orderings for
late/clumped and late/piecemeal types. Therefore, when classifying subjects, early and
late types take precedence over the other types.20
At this point is it also important to note that subjects labeled as EU are merely those
who do not have non-standard preferences over the resolution of risk. Though myopic
loss aversion is not a feature of the standard expected utility model, it is possible that
subjects who are labeled as EU in the classification task may still be myopically loss
averse. This is because the question of whether or not a subject displays myopic loss
aversion is independent of his preferences over the resolution of risk.
In total, there are 192 possible preferences orderings that subjects can submit.21 Early
and late types correspond with only one of those preference orderings each. Any or-
dering in which subjects are indifferent between all four gambles corresponds with the
expected utility type; there are 24 of these orderings. Clumped and piecemeal types
correspond with 4 preference orderings each. The remaining four types – early/clumped,
late/clumped, early/piecemeal, and late/piecemeal – correspond with 6 preference order-
ings each. The remaining 134 possible preference orderings cannot be rationalized in the
present framework, and are thus considered unclassifiable.
20Thus, a subject will be classified as early/clumped if and only if he has preferences satisfying three
conditions: (1) A  C  D, (2) A  B, and (3) not A  C  D  B.
21For the sake of this analysis, A  B  C ∼ D and A  B  D ∼ C would be considered different
preference orderings.
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Table 4: Distribution of Types
Timing UnclassifiableEarly Neither Late
Concentration
Clumped KR16 (0.14)
KR
1 (0.01)
-
0
22 (0.19)Neither
KR/KP
20 (0.17)
EU
26 (0.23)
KP
1 (.01)
Piecemeal -10 (0.09)
EFK
2 (0.02)
-
17 (0.15)
This table contains the number of subjects (out of 115) of each type. Proportions are given in
parentheses.
Table 4 shows the distribution of types resulting from the classification task, as well as the
models which predict each type. If subjects were behaving randomly, we would expect
the proportions of subjects of each type to correspond with the proportion of preference
orderings which generate that type. For example, with random behavior, 24/192 or
12.5% of subjects would be EU, 134/192 or 69.8% of subjects would be unclassifiable,
1/192 or 0.5% would be early types, etc. A one-sample test of proportions strongly
rejects this hypothesis, (p < 0.001), suggesting that subject behavior is not random.
This finding is further supported by the fact that 17% (20/115) of subjects submitted
the single preference ordering, A  C  D  B, that corresponds with the early type.
Comparing the preference models’ predictions with the results in table 4 reveals some
stark results. Clumped types, late types, and piecemeal types can all be rationalized by
one of the preference models presented in section 2.2, yet there are not large numbers of
subjects with any of these types in the data. There are however, moderate numbers of
subjects with early/piecemeal and late/piecemeal preferences, which are not predicted
by any one preference model. Thus, it appears that Ely, Frankel and Kamenica’s (2015)
model has some predictive power, though the majority of subjects with piecemeal prefer-
ences also have non-standard preferences on the timing dimension – a finding that these
22
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authors do not anticipate.
On the whole, Kőszegi and Rabin’s model performs well, with 32% (37/115) of subjects’
preferences falling under one of the three types predicted by this model. Kreps and
Porteus’s model also performs reasonably well, as it is able to rationalize 18% (21/115)
of the data. Finally, the standard model can account for 23% (26/115) of subjects’
preferences. As there appears to be significant heterogeneity in subjects’ preferences
over the resolution of risk, these results reject hypothesis 1, which states that subjects
are predominantly EU types.
The remainder of the hypotheses involve data from the investment task, which are sum-
marized in figure 2.
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Figure 2: Investments by Feedback Frequency Within Preference Types
Error bars show 90% confidence intervals. Values above bars are average invest-
ments; values below bars are observations. The difference-in-differences (DID)
between KR and Non-KR is not significant, though the DID between KR and EU
is marginally significant (p = 0.100).
Hypothesis 2 states that, among all subjects, investments are lower in the F treatment
than in the I treatment. Testing this hypothesis requires only a comparison of investment
levels across treatments. The leftmost pair of bars in figure 2 shows the total investment
over all nine rounds between treatments. As the figure makes clear, there is an overall
treatment effect in the anticipated direction. A one-tailed Mann-Whitney U -test22 con-
firms that this difference is, in fact, significant (p = 0.033). Panel A of figure 3 presents
the CDFs for these same treatment groups. This graph shows that the treatment effect
is roughly uniform across investment levels, with the exception of subjects with very
low investments. Among these subjects, there does not appear to be a treatment effect.
22I follow Gneezy and Potters (1997) by reporting one-tailed significance levels, since AGRR makes a
directional prediction (that investments in the F treatment will be lower than those in the I treatment).
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The magnitude of the treatment effect – measured as the average investment in I di-
vided by the average investment in F – is similar to that of Gneezy and Potter’s original
experiment (1.21 in the present study versus 1.33 in Gneezy and Potters).
Figure 3: CDFs of Investments by Feedback Frequency Within Preference Types
Hypotheses 3 and 4 make different predictions about the size of the treatment effect
across preference types. Following hypothesis 3, Kőszegi and Rabin argue that AGRR
is caused by preferences over the resolution of risk, so only early, early/clumped, and
clumped types will invest less in the F treatment than in the I treatment. On the other
hand, following hypothesis 4, myopic loss aversion assumes that AGRR is caused by a
cognitive error, and therefore all preference types will invest less in the F treatment than
25
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in the I treatment.
The second and third set of bars in figure 2 address hypothesis 3. The second set of bars,
KR, show the treatment effect for only those subjects who had non-standard preferences
consistent with the predictions of the Kőszegi-Rabin model: early, early/clumped and
clumped types. As the bar graph suggests, a one-sided Mann-Whitney U -test finds
that the difference in investments across treatments is statistically significant for this
subpopulation (p = 0.045). The third set of bars, Non-KR, shows the treatment effect
among the complementary subpopulation, that is, the subjects who’s preferences are not
labeled KR in table 4. Though the treatment effect is in the direction consistent with
AGRR, the difference in investments is only marginally significant (one-sided Mann-
Whitney U -test, p = 0.066).
The treatment effect is considerably larger for subjects with Kőszegi-Rabin preference
types (190 cents) than for subjects of other types (88 cents), though the difference-in-
differences comparing the treatment effects between these groups is not significant at
standard confidence levels (p = 0.224).23 Panels B and C of figure 3 compare the CDFs
of investments by treatment among KR and Non-KR types, respectively. These graphs
lend further support to hypothesis 3, as I-treatment investments first-order stochastically
dominate F -treatment investments among KR types, though this is not true among non-
KR subjects.
Benartzi and Thaler’s (1995) theory of myopic loss aversion is the motivation for hy-
pothesis 4. These authors assume that individuals make a cognitive error in aggregating
23That is, for the dummy variables Fi (indicating whether or not subject i is in treatment F ) and
KRi (indicating whether or not subject i is a Kőszegi-Rabin type, consider the regression:
yi = β0 + β1Fi + β2KRi + β3Fi ×KRi + εi
The p-value is that of the t-statistic associated with βˆ3.
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risk, and therefore, AGRR is independent of preference type. If hypothesis 4 is correct,
investments should be lower in the F treatment than in the I treatment for all preference
types. As the rightmost pair of bars in figure 2 shows, this is not the case. Among EU
types, who constitute nearly a quarter of experimental subjects, investments in the F
treatment are actually slightly higher than those in the I treatment, though the difference
is far from from significant. Panel D of figure 3 emphasizes this point, as there appears
to be no significant difference between treatments for any investment level. Moreover,
the difference-in-differences comparing only KR and EU types is (marginally) significant
(t-statistic, p = 0.075; see footnote 23), a result which myopic loss aversion cannot ac-
count for. Taken in sum, the previous results argue in favor of accepting hypothesis
3 and rejecting hypothesis 4. In light of these data, Kőszegi-Rabin preferences offer a
more convincing explanation for AGRR than Benartzi and Thaler’s theory of myopic loss
aversion.
Next, I test hypothesis 3.1 by asking if, among KR types, AGRR increases as preferences
become stronger. In order to measure the strength of a subject’s cardinal preferences,
I sum the total amount of money each subject stated they would be willing to pay in
the classification task. I call this a subject’s WTP. As this task involves subjects paying
for (weakly) preferred probability distributions, I assume that a larger WTP corresponds
with stronger cardinal preferences over the gambles A, B, C, and D. To examine whether
stronger preferences correspond with more severe AGRR, I regress the natural log of the
total amount bet in the investment task on WTP for subject i in treatment t ∈ I, F :
ln(Total Investmentti) = β
t
0 + β
tWTPti + ε
t
i
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Figure 4: Investment versus WTP by Treatment in Investment Task, Kőszegi-Rabin
Types Only
0
20
0
40
0
60
0
80
0
10
00
To
ta
l In
ve
stm
en
t
0 1 2 3 4 5
WTP ($)
Frequent Infrequent
Investment by Amount Paid in Classification Task, KR Types
The results of these two regressions (one for each treatment) are plotted in figure 4.
As this figure shows, KR types with small WTPs invest roughly equal amounts in the
investment task, regardless of whether they are in the F or I treatment. That is, subjects
with weak preferences tend to have less AGRR. However, as subjects’ WTPs increase,
the difference in investments across treatments increases as well. This is reflected in
figure 4 by the widening gap between the dashed and solid lines. As the figure shows,
the AGRR seems to be driven by subjects in the frequent feedback treatment. This is
confirmed by the regression results, which find βˆF = −0.227 (p = 0.041). Interpreting
this coefficient, I find that a marginal increase in WTP of $1 is associated with a 22.7%
decrease in total investment in the investment task for KR types in the F treatment. For
comparison, I find βˆI = 0.025 (p = 0.387). This coefficient says that a marginal increase
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in WTP of $1 is associated with a 2.5% increase in total investment among KR types in
the I treatment (thought this increase is not statistically significant).
1.5 Conclusion
In this paper, I develop an experiment to identify the cause of aversion to the gradual
resolution of risk, the empirical finding that individuals invest less in risky assets when
provided with more frequent feedback about the value of those assets. This finding has
been reproduced in the laboratory several times, and it is thought to be the driver of
important macroeconomic phenomena, such as the large difference in average returns
between risk-free debt and the S&P 500. The theory literature has produced two expla-
nations for AGRR, each of which, if correct, would have important policy implications.
Benartzi and Thaler’s (1995) theory of myopic loss aversion argues that AGRR is the
result of a cognitive error called “narrow bracketing”, in which investors fail to consider
the fact that the risk they currently face will be integrated with other future risk. By
contrast, Kőszegi and Rabin (2009) propose a preferences-based explanation, asserting
that AGRR is the result of non-standard preferences over the resolution of risk.
I test Kőszegi and Rabin’s claim using two experimental tasks. In the first task, subjects
are classified as one of nine preference types. These types not only include the predictions
of Kőszegi and Rabin and the standard expected utility model, but also the types pre-
dicted by the work of Ely, Frankel, and Kamenica (2015) and Kreps and Porteus (1978).
After the classification task, subjects make choices in a simple dynamic investment envi-
ronment which is a replication of the experimental task of Gneezy and Potters (1997). In
this second task, the frequency of feedback that subjects receive about the performance of
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their investments is experimentally varied in a between-subjects design. This task shows
that experimental subjects do, in the aggregate, display AGRR. Using the results of the
classification task, I show that this AGRR is driven by Kőszegi-Rabin preference types,
suggesting that non-standard preferences over the resolution of risk are the underlying
cause of the results in Gneezy and Potter’s experiment. These findings suggest that the
seemingly low amount of investment in dynamic assets like the S&P 500 may not be the
result of a cognitive error, but instead the expression of preferences. An investor who,
for example, chooses a conservative retirement portfolio and checks the performance of
that portfolio on a regular basis, would, under the lens of Benartzi and Thaler’s my-
opic loss aversion, be making a welfare-decreasing mistake. However, in Kőszegi and
Rabin’s framework, this investor may receive disutility by living with uncertainty about
the future, and such a course of action may be that investor’s utility-maximizing plan.
My results recommend a simple policy for financial institutions releasing information to
investors about their portfolios’ performance: do not force investors to view financial
information, but make such information readily accessible for those to wish to have it.
As preferences over the resolution of risk appear to be driving investment decisions, and
my results show significant heterogeneity in these preferences, such a laissez-faire policy
would allow investors to decide on feedback frequencies which maximize utility given
their preferences.
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1.6 Supplementary Details on Preference Models
This section provides additional detail on the preference models of Kőszegi and Rabin
(2009); Ely, Frankel, and Kamenica (2015); and Kreps and Porteus (1978). It includes
simple examples which illustrate the mechanics of each model.
1.6.1 Kőszegi and Rabin (2009)
There are two differences between Kőszegi and Rabin’s full model, and the simplified
version presented in section 2: first, the authors assume consumption is K-dimensional
(instead of one-dimensional), and second, a more general loss aversion function is consid-
ered. In the more general model, Kőszegi and Rabin assume that agents have preferences
described by the following function (Kőszegi and Rabin’s equation 1):
ut = m(ct) +
T∑
τ=t
γt,τN(Ft,τ |Ft−1,τ )
m(ct) is the standard reference-independent utility from consumption. Ft,τ = (F 1t,τ , ..., FKt,τ )
are the beliefs held in period t about period-τ consumption in each of the K dimensions.
The terms N(Ft,τ |Ft−1,τ ) capture gain-loss utility generated by changes in beliefs from
period t − 1 to period t about these future consumptions. N(Ft,τ |Ft−1,τ ) is the sum of
the gain-loss utilities in each dimension. That is, N(Ft,τ |Ft−1,τ ) =
∑K
k=1N
k(F kt,τ |F kt−1,τ ),
where the gain-loss utility on dimension k, Nk(F kt,τ |F kt−1,τ ), is given by:
Nk(F kt,τ |F kt−1,τ ) =
∫ 1
0
µ[mk(cFt,τ (p))−mk(cFt−1,τ (p))]dp
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Where, for any distribution F over R and any p ∈ (0, 1), cF (p) is the consumption
level at the percentile p, defined implicitly by the conditions that F (cF (p)) ≥ p and
F (c) < p, ∀c < cF (p). µ(·) is a loss aversion value function24. Intuitively, the agent makes
“ordered comparisons” between his current beliefs, F kt,τ , and previous beliefs, F kt−1,τ . He
compares the best percentile of outcomes under F kt,τ to the best percentile of outcomes
under F kt−1,τ , the second-best percentile of outcomes under F kt,τ to the second-best under
F kt−1,τ , etc. He is loss averse in all such comparisons.
To illustrate the mechanics of Kőszegi and Rabin’s model, I consider a simple example
which appears in the authors’ original text. Assume there are two periods, 1 and 2, and
that no consumption takes place in period 1. There is only one consumption dimension in
period 2, andm(c2) = c2. There are two equiprobable possible consumption levels, c2 = 0
and c2 = 1, and the agent has no control over his consumption. He may, however, receive
a signal s ∈ {0, 1} in period 1 which is accurate with probability q > 0.5. For simplicity,
assume the loss aversion function, µ(·), is piecewise linear, with µ(x) = x for x ≥ 0 and
µ(x) = λx for x < 0.25 Define γ ≡ γt1,t2 . Since consumption utility is independent of the
arrival of information (as is true in the environment that experimental subjects face), I
focus only on gain-loss utility.
24This value function has the properties originally suggested by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), which
were later formalized by Bowman, Minehart, and Rabin (1999). Kőszegi and Rabin assume a value
function which has properties corresponding with these authors’ properties (A0) - (A4):
• µ(x) is continuous ∀x, twice differentiable for x 6= 0, and µ(0) = 0.
• µ(x) is strictly increasing.
• If y > x ≥ 0, then µ(y) + µ(−y) < µ(x) + µ(−x).
• µ′′(x) ≤ 0 for x > 0 and µ′′(x) ≥ 0 for x < 0.
• µ
′
−(0)/µ′+(0) ≡ λ > 1, where µ′+(0) ≡ limx→0 µ′(|x|) and µ′−(0) ≡ limx→0 µ′(−|x|).
25λ > 1.
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If the agent observes the signal, his expected utility is:
0.5
[
γ(q− 0.5)
]
− 0.5
[
γλ(q− 0.5)
]
+ 0.5
[
q(1− q)− (1− q)qλ
]
+ 0.5
[
(1− q)q− q(1− q)λ
]
The first two terms capture the expected gain-loss utility in period 1. There is a 0.5
probability that the agent receives a signal of q > 0.5, leading to an increase of his belief
that the good outcome will occur equal to q − 0.5. Likewise, with 0.5 probability, the
agent receives a signal of q < 0.5, leading to an decrease of his belief that the good
outcome will occur equal to q− 0.5. Because this news doesn’t arrive in the same period
that the consumption takes place, the effect of the changes in belief are “discounted” by
γ.
The second two terms capture the expected gain-loss utility in period 2. With proba-
bility 0.5, the agent left period 1 believing he would receive the high consumption with
probability q. If he does, in fact, receive the high consumption, his beliefs will further
increase by (1− q). If not, they will decrease by q; this happens with probability (1− q).
The last term is derived using a similar process for the case in which the agent leaves
period 1 believing he will receive the high consumption with probability (1− q).
If the agent does not observe the signal, he will experience gain-loss utility only in period
2. In expectation, this results in a change in utility of:
0.5
[
1− 0.5
]
− 0.5
[
λ(0− 0.5)
]
= 0.25(1− λ)
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Combining the previous two expressions, the signal generates higher utility when:
γ < 2(q − 0.5)
1.6.2 Ely, Frankel, and Kamenica (2015)
Ely, Frankel, and Kamenica consider an agent who does not know the state of the world,
and who derives “suspense” or “surprise” utility from changes in beliefs about this state.
Formally, the authors assume a finite state space Ω, with generic element ω. Typical
beliefs are distributions over the state space, µ ∈ ∆(Ω). µω designates the probability
of ω, and the agent has a prior µ0. Beliefs evolve over a finite number of periods t ∈
{1, 2, ... T}.
A belief martingale µ˜ is a sequence (µ˜)Tt=0 such that:
1. µ˜t ∈ ∆(∆(Ω)), ∀t,
2. µ˜0 is degenerate, and
3. E[µ˜t|µ0, µ1, ... µt−1] = µt−1, ∀t.
A realization of a belief martingale is a belief path, written η = (µt)Tt=0. Ely, Frankel, and
Kamenica say that the agent has a preference for suspense if his utility function is:
Ususp(η, µ˜) =
T−1∑
t=0
u
[
Et
∑
ω
(µ˜ωt+1 − µωt )2
]
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And the agent has a preference for surprise if his utility function is:
Usurp(η) =
T∑
t=1
u
[ ∑
ω
(µωt − µωt−1)2
]
Where u(·) is an increasing and strictly concave function with u(0) = 0. Intuitively,
suspense is induced by variance over the next period’s beliefs and surprise is induced by
a change in beliefs from the previous to the current period. Note that Ely, Frankel, and
Kamenica consider preferences over beliefs about the state of the world, while Kőszegi
and Rabin, and Kreps and Porteus model preferences over expected consumption. As
Ely, Frankel, and Kamenica point-out, their model can accommodate an agent whose
beliefs are about expected consumption (or wealth), which is the context in which I will
consider their model. Both Ely, Frankel, and Kamenica’s suspense and surprise models
hinge on the idea that changes in beliefs are exciting, and the more beliefs change (or
are expected to change), the higher will be the agent’s utility.
Reconsider the example of the agent who lives for two periods that was discussed in the
context of Kőszegi and Rabin’s model above. The states of the world are c2 = 1 and
c2 = 0. For simplicity, I will only consider the suspense and surprise utility generated
by changes in beliefs regarding the c2 = 1 state of the world. In cases where there
are only two states of the world, as this example considers (and as will be true in the
following experimental design), an increase in the belief of one state of the world occurring
necessarily corresponds with a commensurate decrease in the belief of the other state of
the world occurring. Thus, this assumption serves only to halve the argument of the u(·)
function in the expressions for both suspense and surprise.
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There are four possible belief paths:
η = (µ0, µ1, µ2) ∈
{
[0.5, q, 1]; [0.5, q, 0]; [0.5, (1− q), 1]; [0.5, (1− q), 0]
}
The first and last belief paths each have probability 0.5q of being realized, while the
second and third belief paths are each realized with probability 0.5(1− q). Note that, for
each belief path, the belief that the c2 = 1 state obtains changes from a prior of µ0 = 0.5
to a period-one belief of µ1 ∈ {q, (1 − q)}. Either way, beliefs will change by (q − 0.5)
between t = 0 and t = 1. In the second period, there is a q probability that beliefs change
by (1− q) and a (1− q) probability that beliefs change by q.
Thus, the suspense induced by this belief martingale, for all belief path realizations η, is:
Ususp(η, µ˜) = u
[
(q − 0.5)2
]
+ u
[
q(1− q)2 + q2(1− q)
]
= u
[
(q − 0.5)2
]
+ u
[
q − q2
]
The surprise induced by this belief martingale depends on the realized belief path. In-
tuitively, the more surprising belief paths are those that are less likely to be realized:
(0.5, q, 0) and (0.5, (1− q), 1). These generate surprise:
Usurp(η) = u
[
(q − 0.5)2
]
+ u
[
q2
]
The less surprising – and more likely to be realized – paths are (0.5, q, 1) and (0.5, (1−
36
Dynamic Investment and Preferences over the Resolution of Risk Chapter 1
q), 0). These generate surprise:
Usurp(η) = u
[
(q − 0.5)2
]
+ u
[
(1− q)2
]
Ely, Frankel, and Kamenica note that the agent may have preferences over the state of
the world, in which case suspense and surprise utility will augment the utility generated
by the state. For example, a blackjack player may care primarily that they win the hand,
but conditional on the outcome, the player derives more utility from hands that were
laden with suspense or surprise. If the agent in the above example derives utility directly
from period 2 consumption and from suspense, his total expected utility would be given
by the following equation (where m(·) maps period 2 consumptions into period 0 utility):
U = 0.5m(c2) + u
[
(q − 0.5)2
]
+ u
[
q − q2
]
Finally, note that experimental subjects choose belief martingales which they will face
later in the experiment. Thus, I assume Ely, Frankel, and Kamenica-types maximize
expected suspense or expected surprise.
1.6.3 Kreps and Porteus (1978)
Kreps and Porteus study environments with a finite, discrete number of time periods
t = 0, 1, 2, ... T . For each period, the agent is in a state xt and enjoys some immediate,
period t payoff, zt. The agent chooses an action to take in each period, and the state
determines the set of actions available to the agent. The action taken, in turn, determines
the probability distribution over (zt, xt+1). That is, the agent’s action influences both
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her immediate payoffs, zt, and the decision problem she will face in the following period,
xt+1.
The authors present preference axioms over (zt, xt+1) pairs, and show that these axioms
are necessary and sufficient for the existence of a utility function. The utilities of (zt, xt+1)
pairs in periods before the last period, T , are calculated recursively using a function
fKP (zt, U(xt+1))
26, where U(xt+1) is the “continuation utility” of being at the state xt+1
in period t+1. Because neither the experimental design nor the following example allows
for the possibility of “intermediate payoffs” (i.e. zt = 0, ∀ t < T ), the first argument
is dropped from the fKP function for simplicity. fKP is a “utility distortion function”
which “act[s] to ‘convert’ from the utility scale used at time t + 1 to the scale used at
time t” (Kreps and Porteus, pg. 191). As the following example makes clear, preferences
for earlier or later resolution of uncertainty will be determined by the sign of the second
derivative of fKP .
Consider the two gambles from the introduction, g1 and g2. Each pays $1 with proba-
bility 0.5 in period 2. The lotteries differ only in the period in which they resolve their
uncertainty. Specifically, g1 resolves its uncertainty in period 1, while g2 resolves its un-
certainty in period 2. For simplicity, suppose that the period 2 utility of winning either
gamble is 1 util, the period 2 utility of losing is 0 utils, and that the outcome of the
gamble is the only thing that affects the agent’s utility27. Because the outcome of g1 will
have already been determined by the beginning of period 2, the expected utility of g2 at
this point is either 0 or 1.
26Assume fKP is strictly increasing in both arguments.
27Note that, in period 2, the agent only derives utility from immediate payoffs, because the decision
problem terminates after this period.
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Eug12 ∈ {0, 1}
However, as the outcome of g2 has not yet been determined at the beginning of period
2, the expected utility of g2 is 0.5.
Eug22 = 0.5(1) + 0.5(0) = 0.5
Using the expected utility of the gambles in period 2, one can recursively calculate the
period 1 expected utilities using fKP (U(xt+1)). For g1, at the beginning of period 1, the
agent realizes that there is 0.5 probability that his utility will be 1 at the beginning of
next period and an 0.5 probability that it will be 0. Thus, his expected utility at the
beginning of period 1 is:
Eug11 = 0.5fKP (1) + 0.5fKP (0)
Under g2, the agent knows with certainty that his utility at the beginning of the next
period will be 0.5, generating the following expected utility in period 1:
Eug21 = fKP (.5)
As is common in the literature, assume fKP takes the form fKP (u¯) = u¯α (for α > 0).
Then, Eug11 = 0.5 and Eu
g2
1 = 0.5
α. Thus, for α > 1, fKP is convex and the agent
strictly prefers g1 (i.e. the early resolution of uncertainty). For α < 1, fKP is concave
and the agent strictly prefers g2 (i.e. the late resolution of uncertainty). For linear fKP ,
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the agent is indifferent between the gambles, and his preferences collapse to those of
expected utility.
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Chapter 2
Kidney Co-operative: A Mechanism to
Improve on Human Kidney Markets
KC Eames, Patrick Holder, Eduardo Zambrano
2.1 Introduction
The kidney shortage is a serious problem. In the United States, 100,602 people were
on the waiting list for new kidneys as of May 2014, while only about 16,500 kidney
transplant operations take place every year.1 Moreover, nearly 2,500 new patients are
added, on average, to the waiting list each month. The consequences of the shortage are
dire: 3,381 patients died in 2013 in the United States alone while waiting for a kidney
transplant.2
1Organ Procurement Transportation Network (2014)
2National Kidney Foundation (2014)
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At the core of this problem lies a basic, inescapable fact: one cannot compel potential
donors to donate. The traditional solution to this problem is to allow a conventional
market for live donor kidneys to develop, a solution advocated, for example, by Becker
and Elias (2007). This solution has, however, been rejected for a variety of reasons by
a large fraction of the population in the US and elsewhere.3 For this reason, Roth,
Sönmez, and Ünver (2004, 2005a, 2005b, 2007) began the important task of studying
and promoting the institution of kidney paired donations as a solution to the kidney
shortage. Unfortunately, the shortage is orders of magnitude larger than the number of
kidney paired donations that are successfully achieved on an annual basis. It is therefore
important to develop alternatives that would offer a large-scale solution to the kidney
shortage.
As this paper demonstrates, the creation of a conventional market is not the only way
to harness the power of incentives to motivate a large number of potential donors to
donate. The solution we investigate, which we call a kidney co-operative, is designed to
address the two main reasons why people consider the creation of a conventional market
for live donor kidneys unacceptable: first, that such a market would completely exclude
those patients unable to afford the kidney; and second, that donors will not understand
the risks they’re taking when donating, and that they will therefore not be properly
compensated for taking that risk. Moreover, we show that it is reasonable to expect that
the number of transplants will be larger under the kidney co-operative mechanism than
under a conventional market mechanism.
Kidney co-operatives follow a simple set of principles. Patients in need of a kidney
donate a set amount of money to the co-operative if they are able to do so. Those who
3For a broad discussion on people’s perceptions regarding payment for organs see Leider and Roth
(2010).
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need a kidney but are unable to make the requisite monetary donation go on a “waiting
list". Healthy patients donate kidneys to the co-operative, which first allocates kidneys
to patients who donated money, then disburses any remaining organs to those on the
waitlist. All revenue raised by the co-operative is split equally among the kidney donors,
who also receive lifetime “kidney insurance".
Kidney co-operatives are not conventional markets, as some key conditions that define
well functioning markets are not met. First, a kidney co-operative does not aim to
maximize profits (either for itself or for its members). Second, the “law of one price" does
not hold, as patients donate an amount per kidney that is larger than the cash payment
that a donor receives for his or her donation. Third, the market “does not clear", that is,
the quantity of kidneys supplied by the donors weakly exceeds the quantity demanded by
paying patients. A kidney co-operative is, instead, a self-financing mechanism that, when
designed efficiently, can maximize the number of kidney transplants that take place in
the population at a minimum risk to the donors, while keeping all transactions voluntary.
Furthermore, kidney co-operatives are (weakly) Pareto improving relative to the status
quo.
2.2 Background
The simplest environment in which to consider a kidney co-operative is one in which
the distributions of reservation prices for kidneys among both donors and patients is
continuous and is known to the co-operative managers, when there is no risk to the
donors from donating, and when patient/donor blood type incompatibilities are ignored.
We relax these assumptions in section 2.4. Throughout the analysis, we treat all kidneys
43
Kidney Co-operative: A Mechanism to Improve on Human Kidney Markets Chapter 2
as being of equal medical quality, and all patients as being equally in medical need of a
kidney. Though these assumptions can also be relaxed, we maintain them throughout.
The size of the population of patients is denoted by D > 0. Patients who contribute a
set amount of money, p, designated by the co-operative, are called contributing patients.
Patients who do not contribute are called non-contributing patients. The total amount of
money collected by the co-operative divided by the number of kidneys donated is called
the co-operative dividend, δ.
Each kidney donor forms an expectation of the co-operative dividend. Let the expectation
for donor j be equal to δj. We postulate that, for each potential donor j there is a
threshold cj ≥ 0 such that the potential donor donates if δj ≥ cj and does not donate
otherwise. The distribution of reservation prices, cj, for the potential donors is given by
a probability distribution µ over the non-negative real numbers. Thus, if all potential
donors expect a dividend equal to δ, the number of kidneys donated is given by F s(δ) =∫
1{c≤δ}dµ(c), depicted in figure 14. Let c¯ be the smallest dividend level δ such that
Anecdotal evidence suggests that Fs(δ) = D. Anecdotal evidence suggests that c¯ 0.
4Where 1x is the indicator function. That is, 1x equals 1 when x is satisfied and 0 otherwise.
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Figure 1: The Donors
Kidneys are essential to life and all patients in need of one value them greatly. We thus
assume that, without wealth constraints, every patient i is willing to contribute vi ≥ c¯
to the co-operative to secure a kidney (for simplicity, we assume vi is equal to v¯ for all
i). The alternative for each patient is to go on the waiting list and hope to be assigned a
kidney this way, which, for patient i, happens with probability θi. Thus, without wealth
constraints, patient i makes a contribution of size p to the co-operative when v¯−p ≥ v¯θi,
that is, when p ≤ v¯(1− θi), and does not contribute otherwise.
In practice, wealth constraints matter a great deal, as not all patients may be able to
contribute an amount equal to p, even if they would like to. Therefore, in the presence
of wealth constraints, patient i with wealth level wi makes a contribution of size p to the
co-operative when p ≤ min{v¯(1− θi), wi}, and does not contribute otherwise.
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The wealth distribution for the patients is given by the probability distribution ρ over the
non-negative real numbers. Thus, if all patients believe that the probability of obtaining
a kidney by going on the waiting list is equal to θ, the number of contributing patients is
given by FD(p, θ) =
∫
1p≤min{v¯(1−θi),wdρ(w), depicted in figure 2. Note that FD(0, θ) = D
for any θ ∈ [0, 1). We denote FD(p, 0) simply as FD(p).
Figure 2: The Patients
The current situation in the United States can be described using the above notation.
Under the status quo, p0 = δ0 = 0 and D − F S(0) > 0, thus, there is a kidney shortage.
All patients go on the waiting list and have a positive probability of obtaining a kidney
that is equal to θ0 = F
S(0)
D
. Anecdotal evidence suggests that F S(0) D, and therefore
that θ0 is small.
Under the conventional market mechanism, all patients buy kidneys from donors at a
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single price and markets clear, that is, pm = δm > 0 and FD(pm, θm) = F S(pm) = Fm,
implying that θm = 0. Society exhibits a smaller kidney shortage, D − F S(pm). Thus,
under the market mechanism, there are more transplants than under the status quo.
However, the outcome under this mechanism is not a Pareto improvement over the status
quo, as a fraction of the patients (those with an inability to pay prices above pm) go
from having a positive probability of obtaining a kidney under the status quo to a zero
probability of obtaining a kidney under the conventional market mechanism. Figure 3
contrasts the status quo with the conventional market mechanism.
Figure 3: The Status Quo Versus the Conventional Market Mechanism
In what follows, we sometimes assume that the equilibrium of the market mechanism
occurs on the inelastic portion of the demand curve for kidneys; we call this Assumption
1. Algebraically, this assumption states that:
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∣∣∣∣∂FD(pm, θm)∂p pmFm
∣∣∣∣ < 1
Without wealth constraints, Pareto optimality (and basic humanitarian concerns) implies
that all patients should receive a kidney.5 This outcome is difficult to attain for two
reasons. First, wealth constraints typically bind for many patients, and second, one
cannot compel potential donors to donate. A kidney co-operative addresses both these
concerns.
2.3 The Kidney Co-operative
The function of a kidney co-operative is simple: it collects a set amount of cash, p,
from each contributing patient, and it distributes the collected cash evenly amongst all
kidney donors. We identify two desirable traits that a co-operative can possess. The
first is viability – a kidney co-operative is viable if all contributing patients receive a
kidney. The second is voluntariness. A kidney co-operative is voluntary if all healthy
individuals wishing to donate a kidney to the co-operative are able to do so, and if all
healthy individuals wishing not to donate are free not to. Likewise, under a voluntary
kidney co-operative, all contributing patients must prefer to contribute than otherwise.
We call a co-operative sustainable if it is both viable and voluntary.
Formally, a sustainable kidney co-operative is characterized by a contribution level p∗, a
supply of kidneys F ∗, and a fraction of non-contributing members receiving kidneys θ∗,
5This is true when and the size of potential donors is greater than D. If either of these conditions do
not hold, Pareto optimality requires that only donors for which v¯ ≥ c¯ donate, until either all D patients
have received transplants, or all donors for whom v¯ ≥ c¯ have donated.
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which satisfy:
1. 0 < FD(p∗, θ∗) ≤ F S(δ∗) = F ∗
2. δ∗ = p
∗·FD(p∗,θ∗)
F ∗
3. θ∗ = F
∗−FD(p∗,θ∗)
D−FD(p∗,θ∗)
A kidney co-operative must be designed carefully for it to be sustainable. A low value
for p∗ is socially desirable because it would be affordable to a large number of patients,
however, such a value of p∗ may not generate enough revenue to incentivize a sufficiently
large number of donations to make the co-operative viable. A large number of kidney
donations, F ∗, would also be desirable from an efficiency standpoint, but it may only be
achievable with a level of revenue that the contributing patients are not able to provide.
Lastly, a large probability of getting a kidney for those staying on the waiting list, θ∗,
may also be desirable, but it might induce contributing patients to go on the waiting list
instead of contributing. A sustainable kidney co-operative balances these tradeoffs and,
when well designed, produces large values for F ∗ and θ∗ nevertheless.
Sustainable kidney co-operatives always exist. This is illustrated by the fact that the
equilibrium of the conventional market mechanism can always be implemented as the
outcome of a kidney co-operative. If the co-operative’s managers set p∗ = pm, the
solution to equations 1 and 2 above generate a quantity of donations F ∗ equal to Fm,
and a co-operative dividend δ∗ equal to pm. Thus, the same conditions that guarantee
the existence of conventional market equilibria also guarantee the existence of sustainable
kidney co-operatives. As a general rule, however, there are more sustainable kidney co-
operatives than equilibria of the market mechanism, a fact that has important normative
implications, as discussed below.
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We now illustrate how to find values for (p, F, θ) that characterize a sustainable kidney
co-operative. First, consider a value for p (say, p∗) no smaller than the conventional
market equilibrium price pm, and conjecture that p∗ ≤ v¯(1 − θ∗). Total co-operative
revenue at such a price is given by p∗ · FD(p∗, θ∗).
The sustainable number of kidneys donated, F ∗, and the co-operative dividend, θ∗, jointly
satisfy δ∗ = p
∗·FD(p∗,θ∗)
F ∗ and F
∗ = F S(δ∗).6 Next, compute θ∗ = F
∗−FD(p∗,θ∗)
D−FD(p∗,θ∗) and verify
that p∗ ≤ v¯(1−θ∗). If so, we have found values for (p, F, θ) that characterize a sustainable
kidney co-operative. If not, select a lower value for p∗ and repeat this process.
A given patient contribution p induces at most one sustainable kidney co-operative. To
see this, note that, for a well-behaved demand curve and some θ, a price p induces either 0
contributing patients (if p > v¯(1−θ)) or a weakly positive quantity, FD(p), of contributing
patients, who are all the patients able to pay the contribution (if p ≤ v¯(1 − θ)). Then,
depending on the value of θ, a generic p induces at most two possible total co-operative
revenues (p · FD(p)), one of which is 0 (again, if p > v¯(1 − θ)), and the other of which
is positive (if FD(p) is positive). Then, for a smooth, well-behaved supply curve with
dFS(δ)
dδ ≥ 0, each level of total co-operative revenue can purchase exactly one quantity
of kidneys, F . Under the rules of the co-operative, all contributing patients receive a
kidney, leaving F − FD(p) kidneys for non-contributing patients on the waitlist. Thus,
each p∗ is associated with at most one (positive) F ∗ and θ∗.
6To see this, notice that for values of F , say F0, less than F ∗, the co-operative dividend is δ0 =
p∗·FD(p∗,θ∗)
F0
> δ∗. But that dividend level, δ0 is high enough that it would entice more kidney donations
than F0, that is, FS(δ0) > F0. Therefore, the sustainable number of kidney transplants, for p = p∗, will
be larger than F0. For values of F , say F1, greater than F ∗, the co-operative dividend is δ1 =
p∗·FD(p∗,θ∗)
F1
.
But that dividend level, δ1 is too low; it would entice fewer kidney donations than F1, that is, FS(δ1) < F1
Therefore, the sustainable number of kidney transplants, for p = p∗, will be smaller than F1. This
analysis is represented in figure 4, where expression 1 is illustrated as a (curved, downward sloping)
purple line and expression 2 is illustrated as a (straight, upward sloping) blue line. The sustainable
kidney co-operative is then represented by the pair (A,B).
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We say that a sustainable kidney co-operative is (second best) efficient if it maximizes the
number of kidney transplants in the population among sustainable kidney co-operatives.
We denote a generic efficient kidney co-operative with the values (pe, F e, θe). As discussed
previously, an efficient kidney co-operative can never perform worse – in terms of the
number of transplants – than the market mechanism. It can, however, perform better,
under Assumption 1. To see this, notice that, under Assumption 1, a small increase in
p, starting from the level prevailing at the equilibrium of the market mechanism, pm,
would simultaneously decrease the number of contributing patients and increase the co-
operative’s revenue, which has the effect of increasing the number of kidney transplants
relative to the ones that obtain under the market mechanism. Figure 4 illustrates such
a case.
Figure 4: A Sustainable Kidney Co-operative
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Consider the kidney co-operative represented by the pair (A,B) in figure 4. This kid-
ney co-operative can be improved on, from an efficiency standpoint, as there are price-
quantity pairs, above and to the left of point A on the demand curve for kidneys,
which yield higher co-operative revenue, and therefore more transplants. The kidney
co-operative represented by the pair (A,B) in figure 5, however, cannot be improved on
from an efficiency standpoint. It is thus an efficient kidney co-operative.
Figure 5: An Efficient Kidney Co-operative
One of the objections to the market mechanism is that it completely excludes those unable
to pay for a kidney, as θm = 0. Thus, as discussed previously, the market mechanism is
never a Pareto improvement over the status quo. Efficient kidney co-operatives, on the
other hand, have θe > 0 (under Assumption I) and therefore have the potential for being
a Pareto improvement over the status quo. This is the case as long as F S(0) D, that
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is, as long as the initial kidney shortage is sufficiently large,7 which is consistent with
anecdotal evidence.
A kidney co-operative is a Pareto improvement over the status quo whenever θ∗ > θ0,
that is, when the probability of a non-contributing member receiving a kidney from the
co-operative increases relative to the status quo. Contributing members are better off,
as they pay an amount p∗ for a kidney, which is less than the value v¯ they assign to
that kidney. Non-contributing members as better off, as the probability with which they
receive a kidney has increased. Finally, donors are better off, as they receive δ∗ for a
kidney which they value (weakly) less than δ∗ (in addition to full kidney insurance; see
section 2.4).
Moreover, under Assumption I, an efficient co-operative not only maximizes the number
of transplants among the sustainable co-operatives. It also maximizes, among the sus-
tainable co-operatives, the probability θ of obtaining a kidney while on the waiting list.
The intuition behind this result is simple: consider the number of transplants arising in
the conventional market equilibrium, Fm. Under Assumption I, increases of p from pm
produce both an increase in revenue (hence an increase in transplants) and a decrease in
contributing donors. Thus, the probability θ of obtaining a kidney while on the waiting
list increases with the number of transplants.
An efficient co-operative is the most equitable among sustainable co-operatives in the
sense that it makes θ as close as possible to the probability of getting a kidney enjoyed
by the contributing patients in a kidney co-operative (that is, probability one). Note
that complete equality between these probabilities is not viable. Such a rule would make
the contributing patients want to go on the waiting list instead of contributing, making
7This essentially follows from the direct effect D has in the computation of θ∗
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it impossible for the co-operative to raise any revenue with which to compensate donors.
2.4 Implementation and Extensions
Successfully implementing a kidney co-operative requires managers to address a number
of concerns that have been heretofore ignored. This section addresses a number of these
concerns.
2.4.1 Donation Risk
An important objection to the introduction of a conventional market mechanism is that
donors will not understand the risks they’re taking when donating and that they will
therefore not be properly compensated for taking that risk.8 Fortunately, the health
risks from donating have been documented to be very small. Thus, kidney co-operatives
will be able to afford an offer of “full kidney insurance" to the donors as part of their
compensation for donating. Kidney insurance is very simple: in the unlikely event that
a donor ever needs a kidney in the future, it will be provided to the donor free of charge.
A kidney co-operative that offers kidney insurance thus allocates the kidneys it harvests
among three groups of people, in this order: first, previous kidney donors who now happen
to need a kidney; second, contributing patients; and third, non-contributing patients.
If α is the number of previous kidney donors who currently require a kidney, a sustainable
kidney co-operative that offers kidney insurance is now characterized by (p∗, F ∗, θ∗) that
satisfy the following:
8Notice, however, that the same could be said about those who contribute kidneys under the status
quo.
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1. 0 < FD(p∗, θ∗) + α ≤ F S(δ∗) = F ∗
2. δ∗ = p
∗·FD(p∗,θ∗)
F ∗
3. θ∗ = F
∗−FD(p∗,θ∗−α)
D−FD(p∗,θ∗)
A previous donor requiring a kidney later in life is so unlikely that the effect of providing
kidney insurance on the operation of a kidney co-operative is likely to be minimal. For
instances, only 11 out of 3,700 donors who donated a kidney between 1963 and 2007 later
needed dialysis or a kidney transplant. This proportion is statistically identical to that
arising in the overall population.9
Other safeguards already in place today would be exercised to ensure that the decision
to donate is made conscientiously on the part of all kidney donors. A waiting period,
alongside the provision of medical care to deal with any short- and long-term health
consequences from donating, would also be instituted. A co-operative should, as much as
possible, fully compensate the donors for any and all of the deterministic and probabilistic
inconveniences that can accompany kidney donating.
2.4.2 Blood Type Compatibility
In a standard kidney transplant, recipients can only receive a kidney from donors with
compatible blood types. Type O recipients can only be transplanted with kidneys from
type O donors, type A recipients can be transplanted with kidneys from type O or A
donors, and type B donors can be transplanted with kidneys from type O or B donors.
Type AB recipients can be transplanted with kidneys from donors of any blood type.
9Ibrahim, H., et al. (2009).
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A sustainable kidney co-operative ensures that anyone who wishes to donate a kidney
may do so, that contributing patients are guaranteed a kidney, and that non-contributing
patients each receive a kidney with equal probability. As no one is “turned away" in
equilibrium, it is likely that there will not exist an assignment scheme that pairs each
potential patient with a donor of a compatible blood type. This would occur if, for
example, the quantity of type O patients were greater than the quantity of type O
donors in equilibrium.
Until recently, a donor kidney of an incompatible blood type was almost certain to be
rejected by the recipient’s body. However, recent advances in kidney transplantation
have not only made blood type incompatible transplants possible, such procedures have
become quite common in some regions. For example, in Japan, over 30% of living-donor
transplants are now between blood-type incompatible patient/donor pairs. Moreover,
doctors specializing in donations between incompatible pairs now enjoy transplant out-
comes that are comparable to those between blood-type compatible patient/donor pairs
(see, for example, Takahashi and Saito, 2013). Despite these recent breakthroughs, blood
type incompatible donations require the patient to undergo additional costly procedures
prior to the transplant procedure itself. Stegall, et al. (2009) compares a number of these
procedures.
A kidney co-operative will do the best it can to assign patients to donors of the same
blood type. However, for the (almost certainly) small number of patients for whom
there is not a donor kidney of a compatible blood type, the co-operative will cover the
expenses associated with the additional procedures necessary for a blood type incom-
patible transplant. This wrinkle does little to affect the previous analysis. Consider a
function E(F ), which, for some quantity of donations F , gives the expected minimum
number of blood type incompatible transplants necessary. Then, if the additional cost
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associated with a blood type incompatible transplant is given by t, a sustainable kidney
co-operative which accounts for potential blood type incompatibilities satisfies equations
1 and 3 above, while also satisfying 2′:
2′. δ∗ = p
∗·FD(p∗,θ∗)−t·E(F ∗)
F ∗
This equality ensures that the co-operative will have zero expected profits after accounting
for the additional costs from blood type incompatible transplants.
2.4.3 Unknown Reservation Prices
The efficient design of a co-operative requires the co-operative manger to know µ and ρ
which is, of course, unrealistic. The co-operative must be designed in such a way that it
will provide patients and donors with the right incentives to reveal their reservation prices,
so that the co-operative can operate effectively. This can be done using a mechanism
that shares some properties with the VCG mechanism. The following provides a sketch
of this mechanism.
Consider a finite but large population of potential donors and patients. Let I be the
population of patients and J the population of potential donors. The distributions µ and
ρ are redefined accordingly (i.e. they’re now finite). Each patient and potential donor
will be asked to report their private reservation price. Let wri be patient i’s reported
wealth level and wr−i be the wealth level reported by all patients, except for patient i.
Let cri be potential donor j’s reported reservation price and cr−j be the reservation prices
reported by all potential donors, except for potential donor j. Such lists wr−i and cr−j
define distributions ρr−i and µr−i over the characteristics of the populations I \ i and J \ j.
Let wr = (wri )i∈I and cr = (crj)j∈J . Such lists in turn define the distributions ρr and µr.
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For each i ∈ I let p−i and θ−i be defined as in the efficient kidney co-operative given by
the distributions ρr−i and µr. For each j ∈ J let δ−j be defined as in the efficient kidney
co-operative given by the distributions ρr and µr−j.
Each patient is asked whether they want to contribute to the co-operative, and to report
their wealth level. If they choose to contribute, they must contribute pr−i and if they
don’t contribute they will be put on the waiting list and face a probability of obtaining a
kidney equal to θ−i. Ask each potential kidney donor j ∈ J whether they want to donate
a kidney to the co-operative, and to report their reservation prices. If they choose to
donate they collect δ−j, plus full kidney insurance.
It is a routine matter to show that, in this setting, truthful reporting is a dominant strat-
egy for all patients and potential donors. Moreover, it can be shown that, the dominant
strategy implementation and the outcome from the efficient co-operative designed under
the true distributions µ and ρ are very close in a “large co-operative" setting. Loosely, a
large co-operative is characterized by the presence of lots of types of donors and patients,
and a small number of people of each type, relative to the size of the co-operative. See
the Online Appendix for details.10
2.4.4 Timing and Heterogeneity
Thus far, our analysis has exclusively taken place in a static framework. This is, of
course, unrealistic, as the set of potential donors and patients is constantly in flux. How,
then, should a kidney co-operative decide when and how often to “clear" the market?
It is tempting to execute a transplant as soon as a contributing patient/donor pair is
10Eames, Holder, and Zambrano (2016). See also Budish (2011).
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found, or for the co-operative to purchase a kidney for a waitlisted patient as soon as the
requisite funds become available. However, heterogeneity among recipients and donors
makes this plan of action infeasible. The most obvious source of heterogeneity is location.
Having the patient and/or donor travel long distances to the site of the operation is not
only costly, it can be dangerous for an ill patient.
Another important source of heterogeneity is the tissue type, or human leukocyte anti-
gens (HLA) type, of the potential recipient and patient; HLA type is determined by a
combination of six proteins that reside in a person’s body. Opelz (1997) shows that, as
the number of proteins shared by the HLA types of the patient and donor decreases, so
too does the likelihood of survival of the transplanted kidney. However, a “perfect" six-
protein match between two people who are not blood relatives is exceedingly rare, and,
indeed, many successful transplants occur between people who have few or no matching
proteins.
Due to these important sources of heterogeneity, as well as the time required for co-
operative managers to discover µ and ρ11, the market should be cleared at discrete in-
tervals, as in other centralized markets with significant heterogeneity (e.g. the National
Resident Matching Program12). There are a number of factors to consider when de-
termining the length of this time interval. Heterogeneity among patients and donors
suggests that co-operative managers should wait long periods of time between clearing
the market in order to accumulate a large pool of patients and donors from which good
pairings can be chosen. On the other hand, living without a functioning kidney is associ-
ated with both a high mortality rate and a low quality of life. Furthermore, the longer a
11The process by which this can be done is described in section 2.4. Note that µ and ρ may evolve as
time passes as, for example, potential donors with low cj ’s donate kidneys and subsequently leave the
market.
12National Resident Matching Program (2016)
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patient has suffered from kidney failure, the higher is the probability the patient’s body
will reject the transplant.13
The fact that patients and donors are not immediately paired-up has a number of inter-
esting implications. First, a kidney co-operative can deal only in living kidneys. Though
cadaveric kidneys currently comprise over half of the kidneys transplanted each year,14
surgery must be performed within a matter of hours of the donor’s death for the kidney
to be viable. Given the waiting periods between the co-operative “clearing" the market,
cadaveric kidneys clearly cannot be offered through a kidney co-operative.
Furthermore, in many countries – including the United States – cadaveric kidneys are
not the property of the heirs of the deceased, and thus private parties cannot legally offer
cadaveric kidneys to the co-operative. A kidney co-operative would exist separate from,
but in addition to, deceased donor transplantation programs which are currently in place.
Of course, being on a waiting list for a cadaveric kidney would not exclude patients from
participating in a kidney co-operative. The second consequence of such a market design
is that the efficient number of kidney co-operatives is one. Though multiple kidney co-
operatives could, of course, coexist, one co-operative would allow for the largest possible
pool of potential donors and patients to accumulate in a fixed period of time, and would
thus facilitate the best matches among donors and patients.
2.5 Conclusion
Kidney co-operatives are a form of implementing an excise tax levied on buyers – col-
lected in units of the good being taxed – in an otherwise ordinary demand and supply
13Meier-Kriesche and Kaplan (2002)
14National Kidney Foundation (2014)
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environment. In our context, the demand function is interpreted as the “ability to pay"
rather than “willingness to pay", though the analysis does not depend on this interpre-
tation. We have shown that kidney co-operatives have a number of desirable properties,
such as the potential to generate a large number of transplants, a large probability of
obtaining a kidney for those who can’t afford to pay for one, and being self-financing.
We thus believe kidney co-operatives are attractive institutions for alleviating the kidney
shortage vis-à-vis the status quo and the conventional market mechanism.
The primary purpose of this paper is to explore a simple mechanism to solve the kidney
shortage; this mechanism accounts for the objections that the public typically expresses
towards conventional market-type solutions. Future research should involve seriously
thinking about how the implementation of such a mechanism would be handled in prac-
tice, testing the mechanism experimentally, and carefully examining the consequences
that might accompany the implementation of such a mechanism on a large scale.
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Chapter 3
Charity in the Laboratory: Matching,
Competition, and Group Identity
Gary Charness and Patrick Holder
3.1 Introduction
An issue of considerable economic importance is how to encourage philanthropic activity.
In the U.S., $324 billion was donated to charitable organizations in 2015, with more than
$2 billion spent annually in fundraising activities. Additional benefits from charitable
contributions include the possibility of encouraging people to provide more help for those
in need, as it would seem that a society in which people help each other out has more
social capital and is much less likely to be divisive1. The policy implications of this
1Dictionary.com defines social capital as “the network of social connections that exist between people,
and their shared values and norms of behavior, which enable and encourage mutually advantageous social
cooperation". For a discussion, see Putnam (2000).
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research program are clear. If society can devise effective mechanisms to induce more
philanthropy, the social-welfare benefits would be quite substantial, even more so if such
a program were at the same time able to induce a stronger sense of social cohesiveness.
Charitable giving has been found to be sensitive to a variety of conditions, so that behav-
ioral mechanisms may very well affect increase charitable contributions. Yet the study of
effective mechanisms for harnessing the potential underlying willingness to contribute is
still in its early stages. One approach towards increasing contributions involves trigger-
ing social preferences, which are generally considered to involve a willingness to sacrifice
some of one’s material wealth in order to benefit other individuals or society at large.
Prominent social-preference models (e.g. Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels,
2000; Charness and Rabin, 2002) can explain charitable giving if the person considering
making a donation believes that the recipient is poorer than the donor.
In addition, Charness and Rabin (2002) highlights the importance of social efficiency,
whereby people are motivated to increase the total payoff received by the reference group.
Experiments that involve providing external matching for the donations made by the
participants show support for the influence of efficiency in charitable contributions. In
field studies, Karlan and List (2007), Eckel and Grossman (2008), and Martin and Randal
(2008) all find significant effects of matching on revenue, in the neighborhood of a 20-50%
increase2. From the standpoint of a prospective donor, her donation is considerably more
effective – for the same cost, more money is transferred from those who can afford it to
less aﬄuent recipients.
While charitable contributions have been examined largely in field experiments, there has
2However, Rondeau and List (2008) find that providing matching funds does not increase donations
in the field, and Huck and Rasul (2011) find that providing matching funds when there is a lead donor
in place is counter-productive.
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also been research conducted in the laboratory. Perhaps the first such experiment was
Eckel and Grossman (1996), which used laboratory donations to the American Red Cross
as a treatment in a dictator-game experiment. Subjects were much more likely to donate
to the charity than to an anonymous peer in another room. Eckel and Grossman (2003)
test whether rebates or matching contributions are more effective for fund-raising in the
laboratory. Each participant chose a charity from a list of 10. They varied whether a
reduction in cost was due to a rebate of a portion of the contribution or a matching of the
contribution, finding that “contributions are significantly higher with matching subsidies
than with rebate subsidies". Eckel and Grossman (2004, 2006a, and 2006b) continue this
investigation of the effectiveness of subsidies.
There has also been a recent boom in charity laboratory experiments, spurred on by
funding from the Science of Philanthropy Institute. For example, the February, 2017
special issue of the Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, while primarily
focusing on field studies, does contain several field experiments. For example, Brown,
Meer, and Williams (2017) test how “third-party ratings of charities impact charity choice
and donative behavior". They do find that these ratings impact behavior. A surprising
result is that there are no obvious preferences for local groups, much as we find in our ex-
periment. Krieg and Samek (2017) conduct a laboratory experiment in which two public
goods games are played at the same time, each involving a charity. They investigate the
effects of recognition, a bonus for contributing, and sanctions on contributions, finding
that bonuses increase contributions, but that recognition and sanctions are relatively
ineffective.
A dimension that has received only limited attention is the importance of group identity
in relation to charitable contributions. Experimental work (e.g. Charness, Rigotti, and
Rustichini, 2007; Chen and Li, 2009; Benjamin, Choi, and Strickland, 2010) has shown
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that salient group membership can have strong effects on behavior. In relation to charita-
ble contributions, the intuitive prediction is that people will donate more when the likely
recipient belongs to the same group as the donor. Billig and Tajfel (1973) find that even
with minimal groups (formed using a very modest sense of identity), group membership
has strong effects on the allocations chosen for in-group and out-group members. An-
other form of group membership effect is related to peer effects. For example, Babcock,
Bedard, Charness, Hartman, and Royer (2015) shows that participants provide more ef-
fort in a field experiment to avoid “letting down one’s team". Can placing people in even
an arbitrarily-formed competing team have a positive effect on charitable contributions?3
A final potential mechanism is that of competition, and we consider both individual
and team competition for matching funds. Competition has generally been found to
decrease social preferences. For example, Fershtman, Gneezy, and List (2012) show
that social preferences in a standard laboratory dictator mini-game vanish when the
scent of competition is in the air. Competition increases one’s willingness to accept
very small amounts in ultimatum-type games (see e.g. Roth, Prasnikar, Okuno-Fujiwara,
and Zamir, 1991; Grosskopf, 2003). On the other hand, competition has been found to
induce more contributions in a public-goods game where only the team with the higher
level of contributions received payment (Rapoport and Bornstein, 1987), higher effort in
a minimum-effort game where only the team with the higher minimum received payment
(Bornstein, Gneezy, and Nagel, 2002), and more cooperation in a type of Prisoner’s
Dilemma (Bornstein and Ben-Yossef, 1994). Erev, Bornstein, and Galili (1993) used a
“lifelike orange-picking task" and found that team competition led to higher productivity,
particularly when the teams were similar in ability.4
3We use the terms “group" identity or membership and “team" competition throughout the paper.
4Note that our charitable-contribution environment differs from these others in that in our case one’s
decision affects only one’s own payoff and not those of any other person in the experiment. For example,
contributions in public-goods games with group competition affect the payoffs for both one’s in-group
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More recently, Ai, Chen, Chen, Mei, and Phillips (2015) conducted a field experimental
study in which they worked with Kiva, a micro-finance organization, in trying to increase
lender participation. They utilized existing lending teams, which were social groups that
competed with each other in making loans; existing lenders received e-mail messages
notifying them of the existence of teams and in six treatments recommending three
teams to a lender. For those who joined a team, both the number of loans made and
the amount loaned increased significantly. They conclude that the results support team
competition as an effective mechanism for promoting pro-social behavior.
This study is close to ours in spirit, but there are some important differences. First, pro-
social lending is not quite the same as charitable donations, since a lender expects (or at
least hopes) to be repaid and earn a return on the loan, whereas a charitable contribution
is freely given. Second, we randomly assign individuals to anonymous teams rather than
offering them the opportunity to select in (perhaps without anonymity).5 Third, it is
quite likely that reputational considerations affect behavior in the field experiment, since
there may very well be future interactions between various parties and many additional
and extraneous features are also present; by contrast, the laboratory environment is
controlled and anonymous. Fourth, the results of our competition are private while the
results of the competition in the field study are public. Finally, we also consider matching
environments and compare individual competition with team competition. We feel that
these differences across the studies make them excellent complements.
We test the potential mechanisms in the laboratory, where it is possible to conduct clean
tests of each potential mechanism.6 To preview our results, we find that the level of
and out-group members.
5Babcock, Bedard, Charness, Hartman, and Royer (2015) provide very clean evidence that perfor-
mance improves for those participants who have selected to be in a particular treatment rather than
having been assigned to it.
6See Falk and Heckman (2009) for a discussion about the benefits and control available from labora-
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contributions is relatively low in the baseline condition, when participants are simply
asked to donate some portion of their endowment to charity; there is no significant dif-
ference depending on whether this is a local charity or one without local roots. However,
providing matching funds has a substantial effect on donations. Relative to the base-
line, this effect increases significantly when all contributions are matched or when there
is individual competition for matching funds, and it increases dramatically with team
competition for matching funds. We find that the most effective mechanism in the lab is
to form teams (albeit anonymous and arbitrary ones) and to provide matching funds for
which these teams must compete through their chosen level of donations. This effect of
team competition (“letting down the team") being a very effective device for increasing
charitable contributions is a main contribution of the paper. An additional main contri-
bution is to show that while team competition is very effective, individual competition
for matching funds is largely ineffective for increasing contributions relative to having
one’s donation automatically matched.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents our experimental
design and implementation, section 3.3 displays our experimental results, and section 3.4
concludes.
3.2 Experimental Design & Implementation
We conducted four treatments at UC Santa Barbara with an in-group charity (a UCSB
charity) and one with an out-group charity (the United Way). In all treatments, we en-
dowed each person with $21, which included a mandatory $5 show-up fee. Participants
received decision forms, on which they designated whether they wished to contribute $0,
tory experiments.
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$4, $8, $12, or $16 to the charity designated in the instructions (the instructions and
decision sheets are shown in the section 3.5).7 The relevant charity was described to
the participants in every session.8 In the baseline treatments (in-group and out-group
charities, with no matching donations), participants simply chose a donation from the
available set. In the all-match treatment, we matched each person’s contribution on a
1:1 basis.9 In the individual-competition treatment, we matched individual contributions
if the individual was above the median contribution of the participants in the room. In
the team-competition treatment, we formed teams of three at random from the partic-
ipants (visual identification of other team members was not possible) and matched the
contributions of the top half of these teams in the session. Each of the team-competition
sessions had a multiple of six participants (either 12 or 18) participating. The in-group
charity was used in each matching treatment. In all treatments, no feedback was given
regarding the contributions of other participants; however, participants were informed
that they would learn whether their contribution was matched.10 Table 1 summarizes
7The choice to have a limited number of possible contributions was made because 1. we felt that
decisions would be easier for participants to make, 2. we felt it would simplify the non-parametric
analysis, and 3. it is common for solicitations for charitable contributions to offer a few boxes from
which participants can make choices (although they typically do have a space for “Other"). For charities
in the field, we suspect that point 3 reflects the notion in point 1 that people are more likely to contribute
when decision costs are lower.
8Though we do not know our subjects’ preconceptions about the in-group or out-group charities,
we tried to select charities that subjects may have heard about previously (the in-group charity has
been written about in student newsletters and the school newspaper, while the United Way is one of
the largest national charity organizations). The charities were carefully selected to have similar mission
statements; both charities emphasize leadership, education, and health. Furthermore, Michael D. Young,
the namesake of the in-group charity, served a long tenure on the board of directors of the United Way’s
Santa Barbara chapter. Thus, any positive (or negative) feelings subjects have towards one charitable
organization might be expected to carry-over to the other organization. The descriptions students were
provided with regarding each organization were designed to be very similar (see supplementary material
at the end of this chapter).
9We considered varying the matching rate, but settled on a 1:1 match, as this is most common in the
field.
10We did not conduct a treatment with group identity but without competition. We felt that having
more than one team would suggest to subjects that they are competing; having multiple teams without
competition is unusual. In addition, evidence from a public-goods game in Eckel and Grossman (2005)
shows that the mere existence of teams does not reduce free-riding, whereas team competition does.
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our treatments.
Table 1: Treatment summary
Treatment Charity 1:1 Donation Matching?
Baseline Treatments
In-group no-match UCSB Charity Never
Out-group no-match United Way Never
Matching Treatments
All-match UCSB Charity Always
Individual-competition UCSB Charity If individual contribution is greaterthan or equal to median
Team-competition UCSB Charity If group’s total contribution is greater thanor equal to median group contribution
As it was critical for each person to believe that the money that they sacrificed would
go to the designated charity, participants were informed that a check would be written
to the charity for the appropriate amount and that this check would be written in front
of them and deposited in a stamped envelope addressed to the charity. We also told
them that we would then hand them the envelope and they could mail these envelopes
themselves. Of course, all of these statements were true.
Sessions were conducted at UC Santa Barbara, with students recruited through ORSEE
(Greiner, 2015). The database includes a spread of different majors at UCSB, as the
message inviting students to register for experiments was sent campus-wide. All in all,
we had 144 participants in the sessions without matching funds and 130 participants in
the sessions with matching funds. No one could participate in more than one session, so
each observation is completely independent.
Given our design, what would theoretical models predict? The standard neoclassical
model predicts that no contributions are made in any treatment. However, if one consid-
ers that people who are less well off will receive charitable donations and if these people
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are seen as being part of one’s reference group, all of the prominent social-preference mod-
els discussed above allow for the possibility of charitable donations. If one is concerned
about the effectiveness of one’s donation (their “bang per buck"), all of these models pre-
dict an increase in donations when funds are matched; this increase should be larger when
all donations are matched than when only half of the donations are matched. Finally,
none of these models predict a difference in donations between the individual-match and
group-match treatments; however, models of social identity (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000;
Chen and Li, 2009) could potentially explain a difference across these treatments.
3.3 Results
Table 1 presents mean donations by treatment. In the no-matching treatments, there
was an average contribution of 3.333 for the in-group charity and 4.111 for the out-group
charity. This direction is not what was expected, although the difference is not significant
(a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of cumulative distributions gives p = 0.411, two-tailed test).
However, in hindsight, we realize that the United Way recipients may well have been
perceived as being poorer and more needy than recipients of the UCSB fund.11 Also, if
a donor wants to behave altruistically, donating to an external charity may be perceived
as a more disinterested (and therefore more altruistic) decision.12 These considerations
may have been stronger than the sense of group identity we were able to induce.
11In this case, the full Charness and Rabin (2002) model (top of p. 852) would predict higher donations
for the United Way, assuming that recipients are considered to be part of the reference group (which
seems reasonable, given that participants are making positive donations). We thank Alex Imas for this
point.
12Donating to the in-group charity could be perceived as more egotistic (showing interest in one’s own
organization instead of others. We thank Diego Pulido Lema for this idea.
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Table 2: Average Total Donation by Treatment
Avg. Contribution ($) Number of Observations
No-Matching Treatments
In-Group 3.333 (0.371) 72
Out-Group 4.111 (0.475) 72
Total No-Matching Treatments 3.722 (0.302) 144
Matching Treatments
Match All 5.333 (0.718) 48
Individual Competition 5.200 (0.761) 40
Team Competition 7.524 (1.040) 42
Total Matching Treatments 6.000 (0.493) 130
Standard errors given in parentheses.
Regarding the matching treatments, we find that matching contributions raises the con-
tribution level in all cases. The level of contribution is almost the same when these
are matched for all participants and when there is individual competition for matching
funds (p = 0.912, two-tailed Kolmogorov-Smirnov test). The contribution levels in these
competition treatments are 40-43% higher than in the pooled no-matching treatments.13
Table 3: Distribution of Contributions by Treatment
$0 $4 $8 $12 $16
No matching 48 69 21 1 5
Match all 14 17 8 5 4
Individual competition 13 11 9 5 2
Team competition 12 11 3 2 14
For our statistical tests, we compare the distribution of contributions in the various cases,
as seen in Table 3 and Figure 1. Given the lack of difference, we pool the in-group and
out-group no-matching treatments for our main statistical tests.
13Overall donations in the matching treatments were significantly higher than overall donations in the
no-matching treatments (p = 0.003, two-tailed Kolmogorov test).
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Figure 1: Cumulative Distribution of Donations
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests confirm the visual impression that the team-competition treat-
ment has significantly more donations than any other treatment (p = 0.045 for the
match-all treatment, p = 0.025 for the individual-competition treatment, and p = 0.000
for the pooled non-matching-funds treatments, all two-tailed tests). Neither the differ-
ence between the pooled non-matching treatments and the individual-competition treat-
ment nor the difference between the pooled non-matching treatments and the match-all
treatment is marginally-significant with two-tailed tests, although the first comparison
is significant on a reasonable one-tailed test (p = 0.030), while the second comparison
is marginally-significant with this test (p = 0.065).14 We also note that the distribution
14We can also perform statistical tests comparing only the in-group charities; the smaller sample size
leads to less significance. Nevertheless, the difference between the contributions in the team-competition
treatment and in the in-group no-match treatment remains strongly significant (p = 0.000, one-tailed
test). The difference between the in-group no-match treatment and the match-all treatment is signif-
icant at p = 0.088, while the difference between the in-group no-match treatment and the individual-
competition treatment is significant at p = 0.076 (both one-tailed tests, in keeping with directional
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for the team-competition treatment first-order stochastically dominates each of the other
three treatments, and that the match-all and individual-competition treatments first-
order stochastically dominate the pooled no-match treatments. This underscores these
differences.
Thus far, the analysis has considered only donations from experimental subjects. How-
ever, for treatments in which donors may have their contributions matched, an alternative
method of comparing treatments might consider the average total contributions, includ-
ing any matched funds. This measure may be particularly of interest in an environment
in which any matched funds are being provided by an outside party, rather than by the
organization eliciting the donations. Appendix Table 1A gives average total contributions
(including matched funds) for each treatment. The treatment effects described above are
preserved when comparing average total contributions (including any matching funds)
across treatments: donations in the team-competition treatment first-order stochasti-
cally dominate donations in other treatments, and Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests indicate
that donation levels are significantly higher in the team-competition treatment than in
the no-match, match-all, and individual-competition treatments (p = 0.000, p = 0.083,
and p = 0.048, respectively, all two-tailed tests).
3.3.1 Structural estimation
In order to quantify the effects of the various experimental treatments, we estimate the
coefficients in the following utility function:
predictions).
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Udi = V
d
i + ε
d
i
where V di = α
d + βdmxmi + β
d
cxci + β
d
t xti
d  {0, 4, 8, 12, 16} is the donation amount, i indexes the subject, m denotes the match-
all treatment, c denotes the individual-competition treatment, and t denotes the team-
competition treatment. xm, xc, and xt are dummy variables which equal unity in the
match-all treatment, individual-competition treatment, and team-competition treatment
respectively, and 0 otherwise. Udi is the utility that individual i receives from donating
an amount d to the charity. αd is the utility associated with a donation of d dollars in
the (baseline) no-matching treatment, and βdj is the additional gain or loss in utility from
donating d in treatment j, where j  {m, c, t}. As we employ a multinomial logit model,
unobservable errors, εdi , are assumed to be distributed extreme value type I (Gumbel).
We assume that, upon being presented with the donation task, subjects behave as if they
calculate five utilities – U0i , U4i , U8i , U12i , U16i – and choose the donation level associated
with the highest utility.15
15In addition to the specification presented, we considered two other specifications. In the first, a
random coefficient, γdi , was introduced into the utility function. These terms were jointly normally
distributed with mean 0, and were intended to capture “taste variation" that might be present in the
population (see Train, 2003, Chapter 5 for details). This seems like a natural setting for introducing taste
variation, as it is easy to imagine that the marginal utility from donating to charities varies widely from
subject to subject. However, this alternative specification generated coefficients that are statistically
indistinguishable from those in our main specification presented above. We also considered introducing
self-reported demographic characteristics into the model. Specifically, we considered a specification in
which V di = αd + βdmxmi + βdcxci + βdt xti + XiBd, where Xi is a matrix containing subject ages, in
addition to dummy variables for gender, employment status, and degree of involvement with campus
clubs. In total, this specification involved estimating 24 additional coefficients (captured by B), only 3
of which are significant at the 5% level. Again, including these additional terms has little effect on the
βdt estimates presented in Table 3, and there are no notable patterns among the additional estimated
coefficients. We thus find our results to be robust to alternative econometric specifications.
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Table 4: Parameter Estimates in Multinomial Logit Model
Parameter Estimate αd + βd Wald test p-Value
α4 0.363 (0.188)* - -
α8 -0.827 (0.262)*** - -
α12 -3.871 (1.010)*** - -
α16 -2.262 (0.470)*** - -
β4m -0.169 (0.407) 0.194 0.591
β8m 0.267 (0.515) -0.560 0.207
β12m 2.842 (1.137)** -1.029 0.049**
β16m 1.009 (0.736) -1.153 0.027**
β4c -0.530 (0.451) -0.167 0.683
β8c 0.459 (0.506) -0.368 0.396
β12c 2.916 (1.139)*** -0.955 0.070*
β16c 0.390 (0.893) -1.872 0.013**
β4t -0.450 (0.458) -0.087 0.835
β8t -0.560 (0.700) 1.387 0.032**
β12t 2.079 (1.267) -1.792 0.019**
β16t 2.416 (0.613)*** 0.154 0.700
∗p < 0.1; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.01. p-values in last column are for corre-
sponding Wald tests. Observations by treatment: Nno matching = 144; Nm =
48; Nc = 40; Nt = 42. These parameter estimates are generated by pool-
ing contributions to both the in-group and out-group charities in the no-
match treatment. In Table 2A, located in the supplementary materials, we
re-estimate the above parameters using only contributions to the in-group
charity. However, because there were no donations of $16 to the in-group
charity in the no-match treatment, the α16, β16m , β16c , and β16t parameters
cannot be estimated from this sample. For those parameters that can be
estimated, the estimates above are similar to those in Table 2A.
Table 4 reports the results of our parameter estimation. To account for the scale invari-
ance of utility, we set the non-random component of the utility from donating $0 (V 0i )
to 0 in all treatments. To provide an example, a representative subject in the match-all
treatment would first calculate the utility from the four positive donation levels; if they
are all less than ε0, the subject donates $0. Otherwise, she donates an amount that
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generates the highest utility.16
The last column of Table 3 gives the p-values for the Wald test αd+βdj = 0. For example,
0.591 (in the fifth row of Table 3) is the p-value of the Wald test:
α4 + β4m = 0
or, V 4m = V
0
m
The last column of Table 3 addresses the combined effect on utility of donating without
any matching (αd), plus the additional change in utility that the various matching treat-
ments generate (βdj ). Using a Wald test, the sum of these components is compared to 0,
the utility of donating $0. Note that, in this data, all statistically-significant sums are
negative.
As the estimate column of the first four rows illustrates, (the non-random component
of) utility is roughly decreasing in the amount donated for the no-matching treatments,
with αd significantly less than 0 at the one percent level for all d > $4. However, the
last column of Table 3 shows that, in the m treatment, only donations of $12 and $16
generate utility levels significantly less than 0 at the 5% level, and in the c treatment,
only donations of $16 generate utility levels significantly less than 0 at the 5% level.
Finally, in the t treatment, donations of $8 and $12 generate utility levels significantly
less than 0 (at the 5% level), but we fail to reject the hypothesis that there is a difference
in utility generated by donating $0 and donating $16 in this treatment. This can easily be
seen in the estimate column of Table 3; though α16 is considerably below 0, the additional
utility boost from donating $16 in the team competition treatment, β16t , is more than
16The corresponding utilities are U4 = 0.363− 0.169 + ε4, U8 = −0.827 + 0.267 + ε8, U12 = −3.871 +
2.842 + ε12, and U16 = −2.262 + 1.009 + ε16.
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large enough to make-up for the utility loss of giving away the maximum amount of $16.
Overall, the structural estimation squares well with the distribution of donations shown
in Table 2.17
Though Table 2 presents the experimental data, there is so far no indication of whether
or not the differences in donation frequencies within a specific treatment are statistically
significant. The results from Table 3 help shed light on this issue. Pooling the donation
frequencies in the baseline no-matching treatments, donations of $0, $4, $8, $12, and
$16 occurred 48, 69, 21, 1, and 5 times, respectively. The parameter estimates in Table
3 confirm what these donation frequencies suggest: for these treatments, α0 > αd for
dε{8, 12, 16}, with p < 0.01.
The most dramatic change between the baseline no-matching treatments and the match-
all treatment is the proportion of subjects donating $12. In the baseline treatment, only
one subject donated $12, while more than 10% of subjects in the all-match treatment
donated $12 to the charity. This pattern is reflected by the parameter estimates in Table
3, as β12m is the only βdm estimate that differs significantly from 0 at p < 0.05. We observe
a similar pattern in the individual-competition treatment, in which donations of $0, $4,
$8, $12, and $16 occurred 13, 11, 9, 5, and 2 times, respectively. Again, between the
baseline no-matching treatments and this treatment, the most dramatic increase was
in the proportion of subjects donating $12; in this case, the proportion increased from
0.7% in the baseline to 12.5% in the individual-competition treatment. Once again, this
17In the baseline case we should see somewhat more donations of 0 than 4 (since the coefficient of
0.363 is marginally significant), substantially fewer donations of 8, and far fewer donations of 12 and 16;
in the all-match condition, the coefficients suggest that we have slightly more donations of 4 than of 0,
somewhat fewer donations of 8 than of 0, and a substantially lower rate for donations of 12 and 16. In
the individual-competition condition, the coefficients suggest that we have slightly more donations of 0
than of 4 or 8, substantially fewer donations of 12 than of 0, and far fewer donations of 16 than 0; in the
team-competition condition, the coefficients suggest that we have about the same number of donations
of 0 and 4, considerably fewer donations of 8 and 12 than of 0, and slightly more donations of 16 than
0. All of these patterns are found in the raw data.
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pattern is borne out in Table 3, in which β12c istheonlyβdc estimate that differs significantly
from 0, this time with p < 0.01.
This pattern doesn’t hold in the team-competition treatment. In both the baseline and
group competition treatments, a significant number of subjects donated $0 or $4, while
only a few subjects donated $8 or $12. However, the proportion of subjects donating
$16 increased ten-fold, with only 3.5% of subjects donating the maximum amount in
the baseline and 33.3% of subjects donating the same amount in the group-competition
treatment. This dramatic increase is again reflected in Table 3, in which β16t is the
only βdt term significantly greater than 0. Figure 2 summarizes the (non-random) total
effects on utility from various contribution levels in our treatments, visually summarizing
the parameter estimates in Table 3. For the no-match treatment, α4, α8, α12, and α16
are plotted, while, for the matching treatments, the total utility associated with each
contribution level, αd+βdj , is plotted (where d is the donation level and j is the matching
treatment). There are two clear stylized facts: first, utility is decreasing in contribution
level for all treatments except group-competition, and second, high donation levels (of
$12 or $16) provide substantially less utility in no-match treatments than in matching
treatments. While utility is roughly monotonically decreasing in the contribution level
for the all-match and individual-matching treatments, results from the group-competition
treatment suggest that there is a U-shaped relationship between contribution levels and
utility, with contributions of $0, $4 and $16 all generating roughly the same level of
utility.
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Figure 2: Parameter Estimates in Multinomial Logit Model
The structural model allows for a clear illustration of how a donor’s attitude towards a
particular donation level changes with the matching protocol, which may not be obvious
from the raw data alone. For example, consider the question of how a donor’s attitude
towards intermediate donation levels of $8 changes as the matching protocol changes.
In the all-matching and individual-competition treatments, roughly 20% of subjects do-
nated $8. However, this proportion drops considerably to 7% in the group-competition
treatment. There are two possible explanations for this decrease. The first potential
explanation is that group-competition makes intermediate donation levels inherently un-
appealing, while an alternative explanation is that group competition makes another
choice more appealing, and donors are simply substituting away from $8 donations in
favor of this other donation amount. As Figure 2 makes clear, the second explanation
appears to be supported by the data. The utility associated with an $8 donation remains
relatively constant between the all-match, individual-competition and group-competition
treatments, despite the large decrease in $8 donations. This decrease appears to be due to
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group-competition making $16 donations much more attractive than in other treatments.
Examining the proportion of subjects who donate $0 across treatments suggests that there
is a contingent of subjects that will pocket everything no matter what the treatment. This
group of subjects – roughly a third of the population – is approximately the same across
treatments.ă It appears that the effect we see in the matching treatments (and especially
with team competition) isn’t the result of influencing participants who were donating $0
in the baseline treatment, but is instead from increasing the donations by participants
who would have otherwise donated a smaller, but positive, amount.ă The proportion
of high ($12 or $16) donations substantially lower in the no-matching treatment (6.2%)
than in the match-all (26.5%) and individual-competition (25.9%) treatments, while the
proportion was double in the team-competition treatment (53.3%) than in the other
matching treatments. Thus, we see no change on the extensive margin, but a large
shift on the intensive margin. While it seems quite difficult to affect the proportion of
non-givers, one can in fact affect the level of generosity of those willing to donate.
3.4 Conclusion
Our laboratory design is geared towards identifying group-membership effects, match-
ing considerations, and competition in relation to the charitable contributions made by
participants in our sessions. To our surprise, donations to an in-group charity were not
significantly greater than donations to a non-in-group charity; in fact, they were actually
slightly lower. On the other hand, we find strong support for the influence of a different
form of group membership ? belonging to a team in a competition.
We find that providing matching funds increases charitable contributions in the lab.
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Automatic matching funds (without competition) increases donations by 10 percentile
points (or 43%) from 23% to 33%. Competition for matching funds does not have a per
se effect, since donations with individual competition for matching funds are actually
very slightly lower (32 percent). However, team competition is quite successful at induc-
ing a higher level of contribution, as here participants donate 47% of their endowment,
more than twice the amount without any matching contributions. Our structural model
lends support to our conclusions and matches up well with the observed distribution of
donations. We find a considerable degree of heterogeneity in donations; the percentage
of hardcore selfish participants is roughly constant across treatments.
We recruit participants who have not expressed any desire to contribute to charity (in
fact, 32% do not make any donation) and we assign them randomly to a treatment;
a targeted campaign could conceivably be more effective. Furthermore, as mentioned
earlier, Babcock, Bedard, Charness, Hartman, and Royer (2015) find that performance
improves substantially (by 27%) for participants who have chosen a treatment than who
have been assigned to it.18 One might therefore expect more of an impact from people
who have voluntarily joined a team. The reluctance to “let down the team" seems to be
a powerful motivation and we would expect this might well be stronger with endogenous
group-formation.19 Competition per se is not nearly as effective as when it is combined
with being part of a team, as is shown by comparing the results from the individual-
competition and team-competition treatments.
We note that the social-preference models mentioned in the introduction cannot explain
the effect of team competition on donations, since the material payoff of another team
member is unchanged by whether or not her donation is matched. However, an al-
18This is not driven by a selection effect, since 97% of the subjects given the choice made this choice.
19Gee and Schreck (2015) also find that beliefs about peers matter for the effectiveness of donation
matching, in both the field and the laboratory.
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ternative explanation is guilt aversion (Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006; Battigalli and
Dufwenberg, 2007), whereby one experiences psychological disutility (feels badly) for dis-
appointing the expectations of one’s teammates regarding their donations being matched.
The complementary field study on micro-finance lending by Ai, Chen, Chen, Mei, and
Phillips (2015) provides strong support for the notion that team identity and competition
are forces that can be harnessed effectively for pro-social purposes; the confluence of a
laboratory study and a large field study makes us more confident of this prediction.
Thus, we feel that charities can potentially usefully employ the mechanism of creating
(or encouraging people to form) competing teams.20
It is clear that considerably more research (and replication) on this topic is necessary
before strong conclusions can be drawn. Nevertheless, our results indicate that there
are indeed mechanisms that can increase charitable giving, even in the unembellished,
artificial, and anonymous environment of the laboratory.
20In fact, evidence from a philanthropy program at Purdue University provides further support
for the effectiveness of combining team identity with competition. The contributions of participat-
ing units (teams) were matched and these contributions were ranked on a leaderboard. While there
is no control treatment for comparison, Purdue raised $14 million dollars on one day in 2015. See
http://spihub.org/newsroom/blog/item/11-purdue-day-of-giving. We thank Anya Samek for bringing
this to our attention.
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3.5 Supplementary Material
3.5.1 Instructions
Introduction
Thank you for participating in this experiment. Please follow along carefully as the ex-
perimenter reads through these instructions. If you have questions at any point, please
raise your hand. This is an experiment in the economics of decision-making. A research
foundation has provided the funds necessary for conducting this study. For your partic-
ipation, you will be paid at the end of this session. Your earnings will be paid in cash
and/or a check made out to a charity, at your discretion. At a minimum, you will receive
$5 for your participation. Instructions of how you will make decisions and earn more are
provided below.
Decision Task
In addition to receiving the $5 payment for participation, you will be given a budget
of $16 for this task. The experimenter will present you with informational materials
regarding a specific charity. You will decide how much of your budget you would like to
receive in the form of a check made out to the specified charity, and how much you would
like to receive as a cash payment. The experimenter will provide envelopes and postage
in addition to the check, but it will be up to you to place your donation in the mail.
Decisions will be limited to $4 increments. For example, you may choose to contribute
$4 to the charity, while keeping the remaining $12 for yourself. However, you may not
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choose to contribute $6, while keeping $10 for yourself.
[THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHONLY INCLUDED IN ALL-MATCHING
SESSIONS]
Every dollar donated will be matched by the experimenter. For example, if you choose
to donate $12 of your $16, you will receive the remainder – $4 – and the charity will
receive $24 ($12 ∗ 2).
[THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPH ONLY INCLUDED IN INDIVIDUAL
COMPETITION SESSIONS]
You will compete with the other participants in the room. Participants will be ranked in
terms of their donations, and the participants that are in the top half in terms of total
donations will have their donations doubled. For example, if there were ten participants
in the room, and you ranked fifth (or tied for fifth) in terms of total donations, your
donation would be doubled. If you had chosen to donate $12, the charity would receive
$24 instead of $12. If you ranked sixth in terms of total donations, your donations would
not be doubled, and the charity would receive $12. In both cases, you would receive the
remaining $4.
[THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPH ONLY INCLUDED IN TEAM COM-
PETITION SESSIONS]
There are two other participants who have the same colored slip as you ? this is your
team. Your team will compete with the other teams in the room. The teams will be
ranked based on the total donations of all team members, and the teams that are in the
top half in terms of total donations will have their donations doubled. For example, if
there were six teams in the room, and your team ranked third (or tied for third) in terms
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of total donations, your donation would be doubled. If you had chosen to donate $12,
the charity would receive $24 instead of $12. If your team ranked fourth in terms of total
donations, your donations would not be doubled, and the charity would receive $12. In
both cases, you would receive the remaining $4.
After the experimenter has received your responses, you will be provided with a receipt
documenting your choice. This receipt is for our records. Once you have returned your
receipt, you will receive payment and the task will be over.
Review
Please be sure to review these instructions, as well as the document provided. You will
receive your $5 participation fee in addition to the payments for the decision task. Once
the experimenter has answered any questions you may have, we will begin.
3.5.2 Task Sheet
Charity Description
[THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPH ONLY INCLUDED IN OUT-GROUP
SESSIONS]
The United Way
The United Way’s focus is to identify and resolve pressing community issues, and to make
measurable changes in communities across America through partnerships with schools,
government agencies, businesses, and other organizations. The agency strives to provide
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members of underserved communities with amble education, a livable income, and basic
healthcare needs.
[THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHONLY INCLUDED IN IN-GROUP SES-
SIONS]
The Michael D. Young Endowed Fund
The Michael D. Young Endowed Fund for Scholarship, Leadership, and Citizenshipăwill
promote these three pillars of excellence advocated by Dr. Young during his 25-year career
as the Vice Chancellor for Student Affairs at UC Santa Barbara. Funding priorities will
be for Student Affairs services and programs that support low-income, underserved, and
first-generation college students and initiatives that promote student mental health and
wellness.
Payment Choice
Please indicate how much you would like to donate to the selected charity by circling one
of the following options:
$0 $4 $8 $12 $16
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Survey Questionnaire
1. Please indicate your age
2. Please indicate your gender Female Male
3. Please indicate your major at UCSB
4. Please list any groups or clubs that you belong to
5. How regularly do you participate in these groups or clubs here at UCSB?
Regularly Occasionally Rarely
6. Have you ever given donations to charity in the past? Yes No
7. Have you ever volunteered your time in the past? Yes No
8. Do you currently hold a part-time or full-time job?
Part-time Full-time Neither
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Table 1A: Average Total Donation by Treatment (Including Matched Funds)
Avg. Contribution ($) Number of Observations
No-Matching Treatments
In-Group 3.33 72
Out-Group 4.111 72
Total No-Matching Treatments 3.722 144
Matching Treatments
Match All 10.667 48
Individual Competition 10.200 40
Team Competition 12.667 42
Total Matching Treatments 10.783 130
Figure 1A: Donation Levels for In-group and Out-group Charities
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Table 2A: Parameter Estimates in Multinomial Logit Model (In-group Charity Only)
Parameter Estimate αd + βd Wald test p-Value
α4 0.035 (0.265) - -
α8 -0.693 (0.327)** - -
α12 -3.331 (1.017)*** - -
α16 - - -
β4m 0.159 (0.448) 0.194 0.591
β8m 0.133 (0.551) -0.560 0.207
β12m 2.302 (1.143)** -1.030 0.049**
β16m - - -
β4c -0.202 (0.488) -0.167 0.683
β8c 0.325 (0.543) -0.368 0.396
β12c 2.376 (1.145)** -0.955 0.070*
β16c - - -
β4t -0.122 (0.494) -0.087 0.835
β8t -0.694 (0.724) 1.387 0.032**
β12t 1.539 (1.272) -1.792 0.019**
β16t - - -
∗p < 0.1; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.01. p-values in last column are for corre-
sponding Wald tests. Observations by treatment: Nno matching = 72; Nm =
48; Nc = 40; Nt = 42
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